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Abstract

This work offers the U. S. military and national security structure a methodology
to analyze tension within signed networks based on social balance theory, presents a
process to partition a signed network to identify likely subsets within the network, and
pinpoints unique actors and relationships based on the structure of the network.
Relationships identified to cause increased tension within the network are discovered
and analyzed. Identifying this tension provides analysts with insight into the
complexities of the network and potential relationships to target to stabilize or
destabilize a network. Two Social Network Analysis models have been developed
analyzing the relationships of key actors associated with the 2012-2013 conflict in
Northern Mali. Relations between the terrorist group Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), several Tuareg organizations, the Malian government and other key actors are
assessed, both prior to and immediately following French and other international forces
involvement beginning in January 2013. The potential effectiveness of the developed
methodology is demonstrated, through the Mali example, in the identification of a
specific relationship between two organizations as being under tension to change;
subsequently one of the organizations split, reducing the tension and irreversibly
changing the network.
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A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL BALANCE IN CONFLICT IN THE
MAGHREB

1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
A main objective of the National Security strategy released by the Office of the
President of the United States (OPOTUS) is to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida
and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world.”
((OPOTUS), Office of the President of the United States, 2010, p. 19) In addition to
groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, large al-Qa’ida affiliated groups are active in Egypt
(Egyptian Islamic Jihad – EIJ), Iraq (al-Qaeda in Iraq – AQI/ The Islamic State of Iraq – ISI),
Yemen (al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP), Somalia (Al Shebaab), and the
Maghreb (al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb – AQIM) (Byman, 2012). Since 2001, the
United States and its allies have been conducting overseas contingency operations
against a variety of terrorist groups. This conflict has manifested most obviously in the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. American soldiers withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and are
projected to end combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
Even as these kinetic conflicts near an end, the mission of disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda around the world is still necessary and apparent.
Future efforts in completing this mission will require the U.S. to
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strengthen our own network of partners to disable al-Qa’ida’s financial,
human, and planning networks; disrupt terrorist operations before they
mature; and address potential safe-havens before al-Qa’ida and its
terrorist affiliates can take root ((OPOTUS), Office of the President of the
United States, 2010, p. 21).
Due to the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and its allies, any
conflicts against al-Qa’ida affiliated groups are likely to be counterinsurgencies.
United States joint doctrine defines Counterinsurgency (COIN) as military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government
to defeat an insurgency (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms). An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed
conflict (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms). Since 2006 the United States Army has published two new Field
Manuals on COIN, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24.2: Tactics in
Counterinsurgency. In the forward of FM 3-24, Generals Petraeus and Amos state that
“all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the
people.” Elsewhere FM 3-24 states:
Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its
governance or authority as legitimate…. Political and military leaders and
planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity (2006, p.
1_1)
This quote demonstrates that COIN is essentially a fight for the people. To be
successful, all aspects of government (as well as applicable non-governmental
organizations) must garner a cultural understanding and create a strategy that
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incorporates the complex relationships of the local population. FM 3-24.2 states: “Since
all wars are fought in and amongst a population, the Army seeks to develop an ability to
understand and work with a culture for its Soldiers and leaders (p. 1_18).” In dealing
with complex social environments, the U.S. must be aware of and capable of exploiting
the social balance, comprising alliances and adversarial relationships, among the
population. Currently, the DOD addresses the social balance of a population in an ad
hoc manner leading to misunderstandings of the human environment. Actions resulting
from these poor assessments can exacerbate existing tensions, create new rifts, and
further damage relationships resulting in detrimental effects to U.S. objectives. This
thesis presents an analytical approach to address the need to better understand the
interconnected relations of people in an area of interest. While this methodology can
be applied to any area of the world, Mali is used as a case study due to the unrest in the
region. This unrest has been exhibited by the coup and subsequent conquering of
Northern Mali by AQIM and affiliated jihadist groups, followed by the retaking of
Northern Mali’s main cities by the French, Malian and African forces. The situation in
Mali is likely to descend into a counterinsurgency environment with AQIM and other
extremist groups operating in the vast desert against Malian and international forces
that control the cities.

1.2 The Adversary
AQIM is an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization born in Algeria that now
operates across much of North and West Africa. It is focused on establishing an Islamic
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Caliphate and conducting jihad against anyone opposed to their mission (Benjamin,
2012). Recently AQIM and affiliated groups have become popular in the western media
due to their kidnapping of Westerners for ransom, for capturing and controlling
Northern Mali, for their alleged involvement in the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on
September 11, 2012, and the attack on an Algerian natural gas plant in January 2013
that resulted in 37 hostage and 29 militant deaths. Since 2008, AQIM is reported to
have raised tens of millions of dollars through kidnapping operations alone (Cohen,
2012). The territory captured in Northern Mali, roughly the size of Texas or France,
provided Al-Qaeda with its largest sanctuary since Afghanistan prior to 2002. The
actions of the Islamists in Northern Mali, instilling Shari’a law and destroying UNESCO
historical and religious sites have raised alarms and harkened comparisons to the
Taliban’s actions in Afghanistan prior to September 11, 2001. An Amnesty International
report released on 20 September 2012, states nearly 436,000 people have fled Northern
Mali for the south or neighboring countries (Amnesty International, 2012). Additionally,
militant groups are well armed thanks to the recent fall of Gaddafi in nearby Libya and
the capture of Malian army stockpiles (Arieff & Johnson, August 2012). The
combination of extreme ideology, a sanctuary for training, a good financial basis, and
large amounts of weapons and experience makes AQIM and other extreme Islamic
militant groups a serious threat to the region and the world.
Throughout 2012 the international community assessed the situation and
considered plans to regain the lost territory. In January 2013, as the Islamists
threatened to move further south towards the capital of Bamako, France intervened in
1-4

the conflict. Intense fighting has taken place, first between local groups, and more
recently against the international forces. As this conflict unfolds, a cultural study of the
people of Mali will provide needed insight on the complex relationships at work in the
region. In the forward of FM 3-24, Generals Petraeus and Amos state that “conducting a
successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile,
well-informed, culturally astute leaders.”
This thesis presents a methodology that, when properly applied, will assist
strategic leaders by providing insight into the complex intricacies of an area of interest.
The approach presented in this study provides an analytic process that detects alliances
present in the operating environment, identifies unique actors, such as mediators, and
pinpoints vulnerable relationships based on the structure of the network.

1.3 Problem Approach
Many studies have been conducted attempting to identify statistically significant
factors which can be used to properly predict upcoming ethnic conflicts (Szayna, 2000;
O'Brien, 2002; Goldstone, et al., 2010). However, once a country or region is identified
as being at risk, few models are capable of evaluating the multifarious relations that
exist within that area. Network analysis often only considers if a relationship exists. If
two actors have a relationship then a connection between them is drawn. In reality,
however, people have both positive and negative relations. A much different
relationship exists if two actors like each other than if they dislike each other.
Particularly in an environment where there is obvious tension, the type of relationship
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needs to be considered when conducting an analysis on a network in order to gather
information on how relationships affect the network as a whole.
Once positive/negative relationship data is collected, a signed adjacency matrix
is constructed from the data and a directional signed network is created. Since most
real-world large networks are unbalanced, Heider’s structural balance theory (Heider,
1946) can be used to recognize and study unbalanced relationships. If a relationship
that causes imbalance does not change, then it is a source of tension within the
network. As relationships in the network are identified as having the potential to
change to make the network more (or less) balanced, they can be evaluated by
intelligence analysts. If these relationships can and do change as predicted, then the
network can become more (or less) balanced, resulting in less (or more) tension and
cause for conflict in the region. Making a hostile network less balanced could result in
increasing tension within the network and achieve destabilizing goals. Additionally, the
network can be separated into subsets thereby identifying important alliances, enemies
and mediators. To aid the analysis, a balance index will indicate how balanced the
network is and centrality measures can identify key actors within the network.
A balanced signed network can be partitioned into two distinct subsets where
each subset has positive relations within the subset and negative relations with each
actor in the other subset (Harary, 1953). When a signed network is unbalanced,
clustering of more than two groups can be done if the network has no cycles which have
exactly one negative arc (Davis, 1967). The Doriean/Mrvar algorithm can be used to
determine if a network is balanced, how balanced it is at a given number of subsets, and
1-6

identifies the best number of subsets to partition a network into. Blockmodeling can
then be used to identify which relationships cause imbalance within the network.
Relaxed blockmodeling is also used to account for factors other than structural balance
in the model. This method relaxes the requirements of structural balance to allow for
the grouping of actors who have identical or similar ties to and from all actors in other
groups. These techniques can aid in identifying alliances or analogous actors by
grouping them into appropriate subsets based on their relations (Wasserman & Faust,
1994, p. 396). Additionally, it identifies specific relationships that may be vulnerable to
change or potential misrepresentations within the network.

1.4 Assumptions
Like most models, this model is only as good as the data that is collected and
analyzed. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) should be included in the data collection and
assist in validation and verification of the model to ensure that substantive conclusions
are drawn. The proposed model is designed to provide insight to analysts; it should not
be used as the ground truth or for operational decisions based solely on its results. A
number of assumptions are made to enable the methodology of the model. First,
human behavior is assumed to be rational. If it is not rational, then it is unpredictable
and therefore impossible to accurately model. In most situations humans make rational
decisions; however, in some situations this assumption may not hold true. Another
assumption is that a proper decision making process was conducted to identify the
appropriate groups, actors or nodes to include into the model. Depending on the

1-7

application, actors could be individuals, tribes, ethno linguistic or other people groups
that are influential within the societal network. When appropriate data is unavailable,
subject matter experts (SMEs) must provide historical and cultural data on the
relationships between cultural groups within the region of interest. This data consists of
positive and negative relationships between the groups in the study.

1.5 Overview and Format
Having defined the problem and outlined the general analysis approach, this
thesis next provides a review of the supporting literature on the topics covered.
Chapter Two presents an overview of AQIM, highlighting its structure and leaders,
regional dynamics, affiliates and off-shoots, a historical context to the conflict in Mali, as
well as United States efforts in the region. Additional topics within Chapter Two include
dark social networks, graph theory, structural balance theory, identifying subsets within
signed networks, measuring imbalance, partitioning a signed network, and social
network analysis metrics applicable to signed networks. Chapter Three develops the
methodology for partitioning and assessing signed social networks. Chapters Four and
Five apply the methodology to the situation in Mali by analyzing the relationships
between militant groups within Mali. Conclusions are made in Chapter Six as well as
recommendations for further research.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of AQIM and the conflict in Mali, outlines the
basic framework of Social Network Analysis (SNA), and highlights relevant previous work
done on Social Networks, signed graphs, and social balance theory that support the
development and application of the methodology used with the thesis. The author
directs readers to Wasserman and Faust (Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications, 1994), Hanneman (Introduction to Social Network Methods, 2005), and
Scott and Carrington (The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis, 2011) for more
detailed explanations of SNA methods.

2.2 Background and Overview of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and the Conflict in Mali
The roots of AQIM can be traced back to the turmoil in Algeria in the 1980’s and
1990’s. Having gained their independence from France in 1962, Algeria had been
functioning as a one party system until President Bendjedid introduced political reforms
including multi-party elections (Harmon, 2010, p. 13). As a result, the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS) became Algeria’s first official Islamic political party in 1989. The FIS won the
municipal elections in 1990 and a majority of the 1991 first round elections. In 1992,
prior to the second round elections in which the FIS was predicted to win again, a
military junta seized power. The military deposed President Bendjedid, outlawed the
FIS, imprisoned its leaders and detained thousands of Islamic activists in Saharan
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concentration camps (Harmon, 2010, p. 14). The denial of a democratically elected
Islamic government, coupled with the influence of extreme Islamists wanting to
establish an Islamic caliphate, resulted in a blossoming movement of militant Islam
within Algeria in the early 1990’s.
At this same time in Algeria there were Islamic extremists returning from
Afghanistan, following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. An estimated 1,000 to 1,500
mujahedeen who fought in Afghanistan returned to Algeria after Pakistan ended
mujahedeen operations in their country (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 2). These Afghan fighters
returned to Algeria with military skills to incorporate into training camps and extremist
plans to evoke an Islamic revolution (Dahlburg, 1996; Compass, 1994). The combination
of returning Afghan mujahedeen and domestic Islamic persecution by the Algerian
government provided the environment for the formation of the armed Islamic terrorist
groups.
In the early part of the 1990’s, many different militant factions were fighting the
government of Algeria. In late 1992 several factions, which included former Afghan
fighters, combined to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 3). The
GIA began conducting attacks in 1993 and practiced an extreme version of Islam called
Salafism 1. The GIA made a number of high profile attacks including a hijacking of an Air
1

Salafism called for a return to traditional Islam, the Qur’an, and the practices of the
prophet Mohammed or the Sunnah (Botha, p. 12). At the decline of the Ottoman
Empire Muslim scholars became concerned that the Muslim world was falling behind
the rest of the world. Attributing the decline to a departure from the straight path of
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France flight from Algiers to Paris in 1994. Attacks on the civilian populace caused a rift
between the FIS and the GIA causing the FIS to form their own armed group, the Islamic
Salvation Army (AIS), in 1994. The goal of the AIS was to overthrow the Algerian
government to allow FIS to establish an Islamic government. The FIS wanted to
separate themselves from the violence that the GIA was conducting on civilian targets.
The AIS leadership believed in attacking military and government targets only and
allowed for the opportunity to return to the political process (Harmon, 2010, p. 14).
Conversely, the GIA believed in using violent means to establish a strict Islamic
government in Algeria and were not interested in a political process.
As the GIA became more extreme, their focus switched from overthrowing the
Algerian government to their opposition with the AIS (Harmon, 2010, p. 14). In 1996,
the GIA declared war on the AIS and in 1997 issued a fatwa (Islamic ruling) condemning
the entire population of Algeria for not supporting them. In 1996 and 1997, there were
over forty separate massacres of civilians, most attributed to the GIA (Harmon, 2010, p.
14). By the end of the 1990’s, the GIA had lost much of the power they once had due to

Islam, a revival of Islamic thought took place leading to Salafism. The most extreme
form of Salafism, the kind practiced by jihadists, is unwilling to work within the secular
political system to achieve their objectives. These extremists believe that the legitimacy
of Muslim governments is based on Shari’a law and that those people that do not follow
it explicitly are unlawful and must be removed (Botha, June 2008, p. 17). Using this
same logic, extremists often attack fellow Muslims, even though it is explicitly not
permitted in Islam. They justify their attacks by declaring people or governments as
non-Muslim if their actions or statements fall beyond the framework of Islam.
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the success of the army’s “eradication” policy against terrorists, the GIA’s increasingly
erratic and extremist leadership, and its violent tactics particularly against civilians
(Cristiani & Fabiani, 2011). Although the GIA was never officially dissolved, it was an
inept organization by 2001 (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 12) and is no longer on the State
Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
While some mujahedeen decided to accept the amnesty offered by the Algerian
government when the GIA self destructed, not all were willing to give up the fight. In
1998, former GIA member Hassan Hattab founded the new group, the Salafist Group for
Call and Combat (GSPC). 2 The GSPC wished to return to the goal of removing the
Algerian government and instating a fundamental Islamic government while avoiding
the unnecessary targeting of civilians. Within a few years the GSPC grew in numbers to
around 3,000, as former GIA and AIS fighters unified under the common goal
(Kohlmann, 2007, p. 13). In 2003 Hattab was removed from leadership because he
wanted to maintain focus in Algeria as opposed to the global jihad of Al-Qa’ida (Botha,
June 2008, p. 64). This demonstrated a rift in the group and shift in the group’s focus
from the near enemy (Algeria) to the far enemy (France and the United States). The
new leader Nabil Sahrawi (a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim Mustafa) was killed in 2004. Abdelmalik
Dourkdal (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) became the next leader and saw the
transition of the organization from GSPC to AQIM. There were many factors that led the

2

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat is also known as the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat or Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat in French.
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GSPC to join the Al-Qa’ida network. Undoubtedly, the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
were a contributing factor to the transformation to global jihadism. There is a great
deal of evidence that the GSPC and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) had a relationship to recruit
Algerians to fight in Iraq (Kohlmann, 2007, pp. 17-18). Some recruits were sent to Iraq,
while others were kept in Algeria to increase the manning of the GSPC.
On 11 September 2006, Al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
announced the merger of GSPC with Al-Qa’ida. In January 2007 the GSPC announced
their new name: Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The name change reflected the
evolution of the goal of the organization from local to global jihad. The group then
began to target foreign countries and operate outside the borders of Algeria, especially
in Mali and Mauritania (Harmon, 2010, p. 16).
Between 2008 and 2011, the Global Terrorism Database lists 184 attacks
attributed to AQIM. Nearly 84% of the attacks took place in Algeria, many of them
against government, military or police forces (see Figure 1) (Global Terrorism Database,
2012).
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Figure 1: AQIM Attacks by Target: 2008-2011 (Global Terrorism Database, 2012)
In 2007, AQIM had three attacks in Algeria that claimed over 30 lives including a
double car bombing against a bus and a UN building. In August 2008 over 100 people
were killed in blasts east of Algiers. Italian, Spanish, French, German, Canadian, Swiss
and British civilians have been kidnapped over the past 5 years. Several hostages were
killed after failed raids trying to save them. However, most hostages were released
after negotiations. Reports state that significant ransom payments and the release of
imprisoned AQIM individuals have been commonly provided to AQIM in return for
western hostages. In July 2012, two Spaniards and an Italian woman were released by
MUJAO, an AQIM affiliated group, after being held since October 2011. An AQIM
spokesman said that they received $18.3 million and one person released from a
Mauritania prison (AFP, 2012). An estimated $89 million has been paid to AQIM
between 2004 and 2011 (Blair, 2013).
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Grynkewitch and Reifel (November 2006) established a model to determine the
finances of the GSPC. While their work was conducted in 2006 on the GSPC, many of
their assumptions hold true today for AQIM. Table 1 describes the projected income
sources from Grynkewitch and Reifel with the exception of the High Value
Kidnapping/Individual value. The High Value Kidnapping/Individual value listed in the
table is based on the approximately six million dollar per person reportedly paid for the
Spanish and Italian hostages released in July 2012 and is about twice the value
calculated by Grynkewitch and Reifel. The model that Grynkewitch and Reifel
developed came up with the recommendation for Algeria to attempt to decrease GSPC’s
(AQIM’s) ability to smuggle because it was a large portion of their income. However, as
they have been able to obtain larger amounts of ransom money than Grynkewitch and
Reifel predicted, smuggling may now be less important than kidnappings. In the past a
large portion of smuggling was believed to be cigarettes. However, in recent years
there have been reports and some evidence of cooperation with Latin American drug
cartels (UPI, 2010). It is believed that drugs come in through Mauritania, are trafficked
through the porous trade routes of the Sahara under protection of AQIM and other
groups, and end up in Europe. If this is true, then AQIM is likely receiving large amounts
of cash and weapons from a previously unrealized source.
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Table 1: Projected AQIM Income Sources and Amounts
Income
$5,000
$5,000
Food & Shelter
$2,750,000
$6,000,000
$148,000

Source
Local Extortion/ Incident
Local Kidnapping/ Incident
Local Populace
Annual Smuggling
High Value Kidnapping/individual
Diaspora support from Europe

2.2.1 AQIM Structure.

Figure 2: GSPC Zones of operations (Source: Botha p. 46)
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The GSPC was structured into zones as depicted in Figure 2. Often, when talking
about operations within a certain zone in Algeria, the GSPC numbers are still used.
However, it is believed that AQIM has restructured into regional zones: Central –
Algeria, East – Tunisia, West – Mauritania, and South – The Sahel (Botha, June 2008, p.
50).
An emir heads each zone, which is further subdivided into katibats, or
companies, with each katibat subdivided into three or four fassilas. A fassila in turn is
made up of two sarayas, each with 12–18 members, often working in smaller groups of
between two and six members (Botha, June 2008, p. 46).
This hierarchical structure is reminiscent of a military organization which allows for good
command and control as well as a potential for individuals or small groups to act
independently with occasional guidance from higher. The central, Algerian, zone has
been less active in recent years due to increased pressure, including many high profile
arrests, from Algerian forces. The southern and western zones have become areas
AQIM has been able to expand operations in recent years.
2.2.2 AQIM Leadership.
Abdelmalik Dourkdal (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) has been the leader of
GSPC/AQIM since 2004. Dourkdal was born in the Blida region of Algeria in 1970. In
1989, he earned his bachelor’s degree in Mathematics. From 1990-1993, he studied
chemistry and electrical engineering at the University of Blida. In 1993, Dourkdal joined
the GIA, working with explosives. By 1996 he was placed in charge of training courses
for the al-Ahwaal Brigade in the second zone. Later he commanded the Al-Quds
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Brigade. In 2001, Dourkdal joined the GSPC and served in the second zone (Kohlmann,
2007, p. 15). After taking command of the GSPC in 2004, Dourkdal has expanded the
area of operations of the GSPC/AQIM outside of Algeria and evolved their tactics to
include suicide bombings and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas; Khaled Abu Abbes; Laaouar or
Belaouer (‘One Eyed’); Mr. Marlboro) has been a key leader of AQIM since its inception,
operating in Southern Algeria and Northern Mali, and commanding of the El
Moulethemine battalion. He was born in 1972 in central Ghardaia, Algeria. According
to an interview, he claims he went to Afghanistan at the age of 19 to train and then
fight. While there he met a number of prominent jihadists from around the world and is
believed to still maintain contact with Al-Qa’ida central. He returned to Algeria in 1992
and served in the southern zone of the GIA, GSPC and AQIM (Black, 2009). Belmokhtar
operates in northern Mali and is well known for kidnappings and trafficking of weapons
and materials throughout the Sahara and Sahel regions. He has four wives from the
local Tuareg and Arab communities that help to provide him with connections (Black,
2009). Belmokhtar is thought to have connections within the Mali government and
military as well. He reportedly has had a falling out with the AQIM leader, Dourkdal, but
still maintains connections and influence within AQIM providing them with money,
weapons and materials. In December 2012, Belmokhtar split from AQIM in order to
form his own organization “Mouakaoun Bidima” the “Signatories by Blood.” (Jamestown
Foundation, 2012) This organization has been closely allied with another AQIM
offshoot, MUJAO, and described in more detail in Section 4.3.
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2.2.3 Regional Dynamics.
The Maghreb countries consist of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania
and the disputed territory of Western Sahara 3. Generally there are bands of eco-regions
across the continent as a Mediterranean climate in the far north yields into the Saharan
desert in the south. The Sahara is the largest desert in the world stretching across North
Africa comprising most of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Northern Mali, Algeria, Niger,
Libya, Northern Chad, Northern Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea. South of the Sahara running
at 10 to 15 degrees North Latitude, is the Sahel. The Sahel has the Sahara located to the
north and the less arid savannah on its south.
North Africa has been a melting pot of cultures dating back to before the time of
Christ when Carthage was established by the Phoenicians. Many different kingdoms
have ruled the region including the Berber kingdom of Numidia, the Roman Empire, the
Germanic Vandal Kingdom, the Byzantine Empire, the Islamic Caliphates and Emirates,
the Ottoman Empire and, most recently, colonial France, Spain and Italy. The Sahara
has historically been mostly unpopulated, serving as a physical barrier between the
population centers in the Northern Maghreb countries and the population centers south

3

Western Sahara is an unstable country in West Africa on the coast between Mauritania and Morocco.
Morocco has annexed or laid claim to the entire country, but the Polisario Front has actively resisted
annexation. A civil war between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended in a UN brokered ceasefire in
1991. The Polisario Front was formed to represent the people of Western Sahara when the Spanish
relinquished control of the colony. The Polisario Front is backed by Algeria and is based in Tindouf,
Algeria. The Polisario Front is a group focused on the freedom of Western Sahara and does not have
known Islamic extremist goals. Although there is fear that the Polisario camps have become a recruiting
ground for AQIM and other extremists (Alexander, 2012).
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of the Sahel. Nomadic people have traditionally operated trade routes through the
desert to link the otherwise distant populations.

Figure 3: Map of Africa showing the Sahara desert and the Sahel (World Atlas, 2013)
The Maghrebian people are mostly Arab and Berber with some European and
many different Sub-Saharan cultures. The entire region is predominantly Muslim. Niger
has the largest non-Muslim population in the region (20%), followed by Mali (10%) (CIA
World Factbook, 2012). Mauritania is classified as having a mixed Moor and black
population. Mali and Niger are made up of a wide variety of ethnic groups. With the
exception of Tunisia (who’s population is classified solely as Arab), the population in
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North Africa is almost completely classified as Arab-Berber. Arab-Berber’s are mostly
Berber in origin, but most identify themselves as being Arab. Berber is a name for a
wide variety of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in North Africa. Historically the Berber
people spoke the Berber language, although now many speak Arabic and sometimes
French as well. Some of the most populous Berber groups are the Kabyles in Northern
Algeria, the Shawia (also spelled Chaouia) of Northeastern Algeria, the Haratin, Rif,
Berabers, and Ishelhiyen (Shluh) in Morocco, and the Tuareg in the Sahara
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The Tuareg are a large group of pastoralist people in
North Africa, located mostly in Algeria, Mali and Niger, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Mainly Tuareg Area of North West Africa (Melly, 2012)
The economies of the countries in which AQIM has influence can be divided into
two separate categories, poor countries in the Sahara and North African hydrocarbon
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and market oriented economies. The poor Saharan countries are Mali, Mauritania and
Niger. Mauritania is the only country out of the three that is not landlocked. All of
these countries heavily depend on international money in order to function. All of the
countries are believed to have sizeable reserves of minerals: iron ore in Mauritania, gold
in Mali and uranium in Niger. Despite the mineral wealth, given the subsistent nature of
the majority of their populations and the risk to foreign investment, these countries will
likely continue to be poor for the foreseeable future. The North African countries can
be split into two groups: oil countries and market oriented countries. The economies of
Libya and Algeria depend heavily on oil and natural gas. Whereas Tunisia and Morocco
have developed market oriented economies with agriculture, mining, tourism, and
manufacturing as contributing factors (CIA World Factbook, 2012). With the recent
turmoil in Libya and Tunisia, their economies have slowed and less reliable statistics are
available. High levels of unemployment throughout the region are often cited by
experts as a contributing factor to disgruntled young men’s recruitment by extremist
groups. Table 2 outlines the GDP, GDP growth rates, unemployment rates, literacy,
average age, and life expectancy of each of the countries where AQIM has influence.
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Table 2: Significant Economic Figures for countries where AQIM has influence (CIA
World Factbook, 2012)
GDP Rank in GDP Growth Unemployment
Average
Life
Country
Literacy
(2011) World Rate (2011)
Rate (2011)
Age Expectancy
$267
49
Billion
$37.97
Libya
101
Billion
$18.1
Mali
134
Billion
$7.184
Mauritania
155
Billion
$164.7
Morocco
59
Billion
$11.78
Niger
149
Billion
$102.3
Tunisia
71
Billion
$906.5
Western
203
Million (2007)
Sahara
Algeria

2.50%

10%

69.90%

28.1

74.73

2.5%
(2010 est)

30%

89.20%

24.8

77.83

2.70%

30% (2004 est)

31.10%

16.4

53.06

3.60%

30% (2008 est)

58%

19.6

61.53

4.30%

8.90%

56.10%

27.3

76.11

2.30%

N/A

28.70%

15.2

53.8

-0.80%

18%

74.30%

30.5

75.24

N/A

N/A

N/A

20.5

61.52

2.2.4 AQIM Affiliates and Off-Shoots.
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Al-Din, The
Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Garbi
Ifriqiya) (MUJAO), Signatories for Blood Battalion, and Boko Haram are militant groups
affiliated (to various extents) with AQIM. All of these militant organizations are
introduced in this section. MNLA, Ansar Al-Din, and MUJAO are discussed in more detail
in Section 4.3.
2.2.4.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a largely secular
group whose goal is to liberate and establish a separate government in the area they
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refer to as Azawad. Azawad is the desert region in Northern Mali. The movement is
largely made up of ethnic Tuareg fighters. The MNLA fighters consist of people who
participated in the last two rebellions (1990’s and 2006), people who fought on both
sides of the recent Libya war, volunteers from other ethnicities in the region, and
defected soldiers from the Malian army (Attaher, 2012). The MNLA, with Islamist
extremist help, began its most recent rebellion in early 2012. The Malian military, after
initial attempts to stifle the rebellion, was overwhelmed by the firepower, organization,
and effectiveness of the rebel fighters. On 22 March, the Malian army overthrew the
government, in part because of the lack of support provided to the military to fight the
rebellion. Sidetracked by the coup, poorly equipped, and facing a well armed and
formidable opponent, the Malian military lost control of all of Northern Mali to the
MNLA. In April 2012, the MNLA issued a declaration of independence for Azawad.
Disagreements between the MNLA and the more extreme Islamic groups that assisted
the rebellion resulted in conflict between the rebels. By the end of June, the MNLA lost
control of much of Northern Mali to the extreme Islamic groups of AQIM, Ansar Al-Din,
and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012). See the map in Figure 5 for the portion of Mali lost to
the MNLA and other groups.
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Figure 5: Map depicting the territory in Northern Mali (Azawad) controlled by the
MNLA and then Islamist groups. (The Economist, 2012)
2.2.4.2 Ansar Al-Din (AAD).
The Ansar Al-Din (“Supporters of Religion” or “Defenders of Faith”) is a new
organization inside Mali established in 2012 by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the leaders in the
Tuareg rebellion in the 1990’s. There are strong indications that Ansar Al-Din is
associated with AQIM based on their common goal of establishing an Islamic state and
the connections of Ag Ghaly with one of AQIM’s leaders, Hamada Ag Hama. The Ansar
Al-Din fought alongside the MNLA in Northern Mali, but after taking control of Azawad,
the differences between MNLA and Ansar Al-Din became too great. In the Battle of Gao,
on 27 June 2012, Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO defeated the MNLA and took control of the
main cities in Northern Mali(BBC News, 2012). Ansar Al-Din and MNLA are both led by
individuals from the Ifoghas Tuareg tribe, making them close despite the conflict. Ansar
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Al-Din’s goals differ from the MNLA in that they want Mali to remain united and for
Shari’a law to govern the whole country (BBC News, 2012). Ansar Al-Din has operated
primarily in the Timbuktu and Kidal regions of Northern Mali and has been imposing the
harshest version of Shari’a law (Reuters, 2012).
2.2.4.3 Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi
Garbi Ifriqiya) (MUJAO) is an AQIM off-shoot in West Africa. The organization is led by
Mauritanian national Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abou QumQum) and is
seen by many as a way to expand the mission of AQIM. Other analysts see the creation
of MUJAO as evidence of AQIM splintering due to the native Algerian leadership’s
unwillingness to allow non-Algerians to rise through the ranks (Idoumou, 2011).
MUJAO has made several major headlines since their inception. The first was in
reference to three hostages taken from a refugee camp in southern Algeria in October
2011. The three were released on 20 July 2012 in a prisoner exchange and a reported
ransom of $18.4 million (The Associated Press, 2012). This shows that the MUJAO has
adopted tactics similar to the AQIM to finance their operations. The second headline
was a suicide attack that MUJAO claimed responsibility for in Ouargla, Algeria. It took
place on 30 June 2012 against the Algerian national gendarmerie headquarters in which
a man drove a Toyota 4x4 packed with 1,300 kg of explosives into a police facility. The
attack killed one and injured three policemen (Magharebia, 2012). MUJAO’s
participation with Ansar Al-Din in defeating the MNLA in northern Mali has caused many
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to wonder what connections exist between MUJAO, Ansar Dine and AQIM or if they are
different parts of the same organization. MUJAO has been operating primarily in the
Gao region of Mali and have enforced Shari’a Law within the cities under their control
(Reuters, 2012).
2.2.4.4 The Signatories for Blood Battalion.
The Signatories for Blood Battalion, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is a recent
addition to the extreme Islamic groups operating in the region. They officially split from
AQIM in December 2012. As previously discussed, Belmokhtar has been a longstanding
AQIM emir operating in the porous Saharan desert from Southern Algeria and Northern
Mali east to Southern Libya. Due to his experiences and connections from working in
the region, Belmokhtar’s organization has instant credibility. The Signatories for Blood
Battalion is closely aligned with another AQIM offshoot, MUJAO. Their first high profile
operation was an attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria resulting in nearly 800
initial hostages in which at least 37 hostages and 29 militants died (Jegarajah, 2013).
2.2.4.5 Boko Haram.
Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist organization located in northern Nigeria. The
goal of Boko Haram is to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish a pure
Islamic state. Boko Haram has had several high profile attacks including bombing a UN
compound in Abuja, numerous police stations and churches and most recently setting
schools on fire. They have publicly declared war on Christians within the country and
have caused many to move to the southern part of the country. Boko Haram is a local
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terrorist group and focuses almost exclusively on Nigeria (Walker, 2012). None of their
rhetoric has been in concert with Al-Qa’ida’s global jihad. However, there has been
evidence of communication and cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM. Just
recently, General Ham, the commander of AFRICOM said, "Most notably I would say
that the linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram are probably the most worrisome in
terms of the indications we have that they are likely sharing funds, training, and
explosive materials that can be quite dangerous (Doyle, 2012)." Boko Haram’s leader
and Nigeria’s president have made claims that Boko Haram is linked to AQIM. However,
since Boko Haram may be trying to increase its popularity on the world stage and
Nigeria is trying to get foreign funding, it is difficult to know the truth. What is known is
that Boko Haram is capable of executing terrorist acts and is a serious threat to the
stability of Nigeria. If the group decides to expand their area of operations and begins
to work closer with other African jihadist groups like AQIM or Al-Shabab, then the
situation could grow even worse.
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2.2.5 Historical Context of Mali Conflict.
French influence in Africa cannot be overstated as they have had African
possessions since the 17th century. Although much of West Africa gained independence
from France around 1960, France continues to have influence in the area. Many of the
countries still use French as their official language (see Figure 6) and others, being
former French colonies, still have many French speakers.

Figure 6: Official Languages in Africa (Africa, 2008) on left and Map of European
colonies in Africa in 1914 (Exploring Africa, 2013) on right
Mali was a French colony prior to 1960 when it officially gained independence.
Following independence, a dictatorship controlled the country. President Alpha Konare
won the first two democratic presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. President
Amadou Toumani Touré won the next two elections in 2002 and 2007 (CIA World
Factbook, 2012). Given this history, it was generally considered to be a stable
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democracy and a model to emulate for other African countries. However, dating back
to its colonial days, Mali has had ethnic tension and conflict in its Northern provinces
particularly due to Tuareg unrest (Lecocq, 2010).
The Tuareg historically have had a society based on a set of social strata into
which one is born, including a lower slave class (Lecocq, 2010, p. 5). Baz Lecocq, in his
book, Disputed Desert, classifies a Tuareg’s status by considering if one is free or unfree,
part of a strong or weak group, and if they have a prestigious lineage or not. While not
always accurate, the slave class was traditionally perceived as ‘black’ and the noble class
as ‘white’. Even though France formally abolished slavery in 1905, the emancipation
process is still not complete in some Tuareg societies (Lecocq, 2005). The legacy of
slavery has fueled ethnic divisions in Northern Mali throughout history and continues to
plague the relations between the ‘white’ Tuareg and the ‘black’ ethnic groups of other
parts of Mali.
In 1960 when the Tuareg people of Mali were told by the French that their land
would be controlled by the government in Bamako, there was immediate resistance.
The first of three Tuareg rebellions was in response to being included in the state of Mali
and happened between May 1963 and August 1964. This conflict, eventually won by
the Malian government, resulted in many civilian Tuareg killings by government troops.
The Tuareg, whose main leaders were arrested, eventually were persuaded to stop
fighting, leading to a relative calm for many years (Lecocq, 2010).

2-22

The next major rebellion from 1990-1996 resulted in a time when Mali
nationalism was at a high point, as democracy was taking shape in the country. The
Tuareg were portrayed by the Mali government as nomad invaders and ethnic
differences were highlighted and exploited. The Tuareg, fighting in the desert terrain, as
they are accustomed, were militarily superior to the government troops leading to a
compromised peace called the National Pact. This peace incorporated Tuareg into the
military, a decreased presence of the Malian military in the north, provided tax
exemptions to Northern inhabitants for ten years, and a special social economic and
administrative status for the North (Lecocq, 2010, pp. 322-323). However, many of
these agreements were slow to be implemented or were not implemented at all,
leading to further discontent.
In May 2006, a Tuareg group called the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC)
rebelled against the Malian government calling for adherence to the National Pact,
more autonomy for Northern Mali, and a more equitable distribution of resources
(Miller, 2013). Iyad Ag Ghaly, the future leader of AAD, and Ibrahim Ag Bahanga were
two of the major figures of this movement. Ag Ghaly and most of the Tuareg would
agree to an Algerian mediated ceasefire while Ag Bahanga and a small group would
continue to fight, eventually being exiled to Libya. In 2011 Ag Bahanga died in a car
accident. His organization would eventually join the MNLA in their quest for an
independent Azawad.
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The most recent Tuareg rebellion, beginning in January 2012, initially resulted in
large territorial gains by the Tuareg. Organized under the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Tuareg took control of all of Northern Mali. The
conditions for this rebellion were set up on a number of key factors. Previous
agreements between the Tuareg and the Mali government were perceived by the
Tuareg as broken promises. Additionally, following the fall of the Libyan dictator,
Gaddafi, many Tuareg fighters who were employed by the Libyan military returned to
Mali with large amounts of weapons. To add to the mixture, AQIM and other Islamic
extremist groups that had been operating in the region for years were willing to assist
the MNLA in armed resistance against the government. These organizations added
money, weapons and fighters to an already powerful group. The Malian army,
attempting to fight the rebellion, was poorly trained and equipped, and forced to deal
with desertions of Tuareg and others to the opposing side. Feeling unsupported by the
government, the Mali army Captain Amadou Sanogo organized a coup to depose
President Touré. Following the coup, the government forces put up little resistance,
allowing the MNLA, with assistance from extremist Islamic fighters, to gain control over
large portions of Northern Mali. In April 2012, the MNLA issued a declaration of
independence for Azawad. Shortly after independence, two Islamic extremist groups,
Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO, began enforcing a strict interpretation of Shari’a law in areas
they controlled. The MNLA, in favor of a more tolerant form of Islamic government,
objected to imposing Shari’a law on the population. This led to disagreements between
the MNLA and the Islamic extremist organizations. Battles began to take place
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throughout Northern Mali with MNLA losing control of much of the territory to Ansar AlDin and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012).
In early January 2013, Islamic extremist fighters began pushing further south into
government held territory. The provisional Malian government, unable to stop the
militants themselves, asked France for support. The French entered Mali on 11 January
2013. By early February all of the main cities of Northern Mali were regained by Malian,
French and other forces. Other than France, the international ground forces are from
African nations supported by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the operation is classified by the United Nations as the African-led
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). By the end of January 2013, 1,400 nonFrench AFISMA troops were supporting the mission in Mali from Nigeria, Benin, Togo,
Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad (Nuland, 2013).
2.2.6 United States Efforts in the Region.
The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the U.S.
government’s program designed to provide support and training to governments in the
Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal)
(Africom.mil, 2012). Additionally, TSCTP is designed to increase communication and
counterterrorism efforts between the Pan-Sahel countries and Maghreb countries
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The U.S. seeks to increase multinational support for
counterterrorism principals within Africa by engaging the African Union and the
Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). TSCTP replaced the smaller
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scope of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) that took place from 2002 to 2005. TSCTP is a
multifaceted approach led by the State Department that includes the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD portion of TSCTP is
called Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). OEF-TS focuses more on
security and cooperation than on counterterrorism. In 2007, AFRICOM was established
and has since assumed responsibility of the military portion of the TSCTP.
Bilateral support from the U.S. government is also given to countries within the
Maghreb and Sahel region in the form of the Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program.
In 2009, the U.S. spent over $500,000 to train Moroccan and Libyan police (CSIS, 2010,
p. 6). “The Defense Department is also using ‘1206 funding’ authorized in the 2006
National Defense Authorization Act by providing military equipment and hardware
(CSIS, 2010, p. 6).” Additionally, the U.S. is participating in the NATO OPERATION
ACTIVE ENDEAVER which is a naval operation designed to prevent smuggling between
Africa and Europe.
The United States must prioritize its potential actions against AQIM in context
with all other actions around the world. The actions of the United States within the
Maghreb are just a small part of the actions conducted within Africa. There are terrorist
threats all across Africa from the Maghreb to Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Somalia, and Yemen (Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP). See Figure 7 for a map
provided by the Washington Post on 13 June 2012 depicting their estimation of U.S.
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military intelligence operations ongoing within Africa and the Arabian Peninsula
(Whitlock, 2012).

Figure 7: U.S. Military Intelligence Network within Africa (Whitlock, 2012)
The United States has supported and assisted in the French operations in Mali
through “refueling efforts, logistical movements, troop transport and information
sharing (Roulo, 2013).” From 21 January to 29 January 2013, the U.S. Air Force provided
airlift support primarily through C-17 Globemaster III sorties. Additionally, the U.S. KC135 Stratotanker supported French fighter aircraft with refueling missions (Roulo, 2013).
The United States has agreed to future airlift missions including providing support to
troops from African countries that have volunteered to assist in Mali. In addition, the
U.S. signed a status of forces agreement with Niger in January 2013 (Nuland, 2013) to
provide an opportunity for increased intelligence collection opportunities in the region.
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2.3 Dark Social Networks
Given the historical background of AQIM and the conflict in Mali, as well as the
United States’ interests in eliminating the ability of terrorists to operate openly, there is
an obvious need to gain a better understanding of the key actors participating in this
conflict. Social network analysis methods can be used to analyze the key actor’s
relationships and make observations about the conflict as a whole. In recent years,
social network analysis has become a popular and valuable tool for modeling and
understanding networks of all kinds. Dark networks are illegal and covert networks such
as terrorists, drug traffickers, and insurgencies (Raab & Milward, 2003). Since
September 11, 2001, due to the War on Terror and increased grant money, researchers
have gained an increased focus publishing many articles on social network analysis of
terrorist organizations. Ressler (2006) outlines social network analysis contributions to
dark networks. Krebs (2001) mapped the 9-11 terrorist network, Rodriguez (2005)
modeled the 2004 Madrid train bombings, Sageman’s book, Understanding Terror
Networks, (2004) collected biographies on 172 Islamic terrorists from open sources to
study terrorist networks around the world. Carley has multiple works: Dynamic
Network Analysis (2003), Estimating Vulnerabilities in Large Covert Networks (2004),
Destabilization of Covert Networks (2006), and Locating Optimal Destabilization
Strategies (Moon & Carley, 2007) just to name a few. Walther and Christopoulos (2012)
authored an excellent SNA of individuals involved in the current Mali rebellion based on

2-28

names gathered in French newspapers. No other previous work has been found by the
author that has attempted to analyze signed dark social networks.

2.4 Graph Theory and Social Network Analysis
Graph theory provides social network analysts the vocabulary, mathematical
operations and theorems to model networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 93). Graphs
have been widely used in SNA to represent social relations since Moreno (1934)
published graphical depictions of social networks in his seminal work: Who Shall
Survive? Foundations of Sociometry, Group Psychotherapy and Sociodrama. A graph, G
= (N, E), is made up of a set nodes, N, representing n actors within a network, and a set
of edges, E, representing m ties or relationships between two actors (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994, p. 72). There are n nodes and m arcs within a graph. In Figure 8, G = (N, E)
where N = {A, B, C, D} and E equals the relationships {a, b, c, d, e} or {A-C, A-B, A-D, B-D,
C-D}. In this case n = 4 and m = 5.

a
c

b

d

e

Figure 8: A notional network with solid lines representing positive relationships and
dotted lines representing negative relationships.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
Actors or graphical nodes are the basis for SNA. An actor can be an individual or
a group of individuals that may or may not have ties to another actor (individual or
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group). Actors that have ties or relations to other actors are shown graphically by
drawing a line between the two nodes. Relations can be either directed or undirected.
More simple social networks consist of undirected ties, meaning that the relationship
between the two actors is given and received by both actors. This type of relationship is
symmetric (i,j) = (j,i). The network in Figure 8 has undirected ties making it symmetric.
In a directed relationship, one actor influences the other actor, but the relationship may
or may not be reciprocated. This type of relationship is graphically depicted with an
arrow instead of just a line. Directed relationships are shown visually in a directional
graph or digraph. Within a digraph arrows point towards the actor that is receiving
influence.
A walk is “a sequence of nodes and lines, starting and ending with nodes, in
which each node is incident with the lines following and preceding it in the sequence”
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 105). The length of a walk is the sum of the lengths of all
of the arcs of the walk. A walk from node A to node D is A-C-D with a length of two or AD with a length of one, assuming each arc is a length of one. A cycle is a walk of at least
three nodes that begins and ends at the same node, all lines are unique, and all nodes
(other than the start/end node) are unique (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 108). The
cycles in Figure 8 are A-B-D-A, A-C-D-A, and A-C-D-B-A.
Social networks are mathematically depicted by using matrices. If actor i is
influencing actor j, then the (i, j) cell of the matrix will have a value representing the
strength of that influence. If actor i has no relationship with actor j, then cell (i, j) will
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have the value of zero. In an n by n matrix, called an adjacency matrix, each cell (1, 1) to
(n, n) is populated with a value representing the relationship between i and j. Each of
the values on the diagonal (1, 1) to (n, n) are zero because only external relationships
are considered. The adjacency matrix is used to calculate measures and draw
conclusions on the significance of different actors within the network based on their
connections. The signed adjacency matrix, an adjacency matrix that has signed values,
is symmetric when non-directional relationships exist within a network. When
directional relationships exist, the matrix becomes asymmetric. When actor i has a
relationship with actor j, but actor j does not have a relationship with actor i, then there
is a value in cell (i, j) of the signed adjacency matrix and a 0 in cell (j, i). This type of
relationship may exist when actors are in different spheres of influence (such as a leader
and follower, where the leader does not know the follower well, but the follower is
influenced by the leader).

A
B
C
D

A B C D
1 -1 -1
1
1
-1
-1
-1 1 -1

Figure 9: A matrix representation of the graph in Figure 8
In a signed matrix, where a relationship can be positive, negative or null, a value
of one in cell (i, j) depicts a positive relationship from i to j, a negative one represents a
negative relationship from i to j and a zero shows no relationship exists. Figure 9
displays the matrix form of the network from Figure 8.
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Most algorithms and other sources of Social Network Analysis are designed for
binary data. Other scales of measurement that exist are Multiple Category Nominal,
Grouped Ordinal, Full Rank Ordinal and Interval. The Multiple Category Nominal
measurement is used when different types of relations are measured. In this case if no
relation exists then a zero would still be used, but a one, two or other number could
represent other relations. These numbers represent categories not numerical values,
therefore category two is not necessarily twice as important as category one. Multiple
Category Nominal data can be converted into binary data for each type of relationship
or to depict if a relationship exists or does not exist.
Grouped Ordinal data uses the binary numbers, but also allows for a -1 value if a
negative relationship exists. Full Rank Ordinal measurement ranks the actors from 1 to
n. This scale indicates that one is more important than two and two is more important
than three, but not necessarily at the same proportion. The Interval scale is similar to
the Full Rank Ordinal Scale except that the interval scale maintains the strength of tie
(Hanneman, 2005).
As previously stated, binary data is most commonly used and widely applied type
of data in SNA. SNA metrics are most often defined for use with binary data. However,
when more data is available, analysts can use this data for increased understanding of
the intricacies of the network. Table 3 shows the different scales of measurement that
are used to mathematically represent data. Chapter One of Hanneman’s book
Introduction to Social Network Methods outlines different scales of measurement often
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used in social networks. In order to evaluate signed networks, Grouped Ordinal data are
primarily used in this thesis. Whatever scale is used, however, it is assumed that a valid
method to develop such data has been utilized. Care must be taken to assure this
assumption is valid.
Table 3: Scales of Measurement (Hanneman, 2005)
Binary
Multiple Category
Nominal
Grouped Ordinal
Full Rank Ordinal
Interval

0 = No Relationship; 1 = Relationship
0 = No Relationship; 1,2,3, etc = different types of relationships
0 = No Relationship; 1 = Positive Relationship; -1 = Negative
Relationship
Actors ranked in order from 1 to n (where n = # of actors); 1 is
more important than 2, but no strength of tie can be inferred
Actors ranked in order and scaled according to the strength of
the tie (1 is 2 times as important as 2)

2.5 Structural Balance Theory
Fritz Heider, an Austrian psychologist, first developed the idea of balance theory
in Attitudes and Cognitive Organization (1946). Heider’s cognitive balance theory
observes how positive and negative relationships coexist within social situations.
Examples of positive relationships are: friends, like, love, or trust. A negative
relationship is the opposite of the positive (i.e. enemies, dislike, hate, or distrust).
Heider evaluates the relationships between two actors and three actors and defines
balance. Heider’s theory is best described by quoting his paper:
In the case of two entities, a balanced state exists if the relation
between them is positive (or negative) in all respects…. In the case of
three entities, a balanced state exists if all three relations are positive in
all respects, or if two are negative and one positive.(1946, p. 110)
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When observing a relationship between two actors (a dyad), there is balance
only when both parties like or dislike each other. Tension is observed in a relationship
where one party likes the other, but is disliked by the other. According to Heider, this
creates an unbalanced relationship and is calculated by multiplying the signs of the
relationship. Two positive relationships (+)·(+)=(+) and two negative relationships
(-)·(-)=(+) both result in a balanced (positive) relationship. Whereas a (+)·(-) or (-)·(+)
both result in an unbalanced (negative) relationship.
When observing three actors (a triple or triad), eight different possibilities exist
in an undirected network (the relationship of i to j equals the relationship of j to i). The
eight possibilities are presented in Figure 10. Heider referred to the three parts of a
triple as P for the person, O for other and X for another entity or object. Throughout
this thesis, i, j and k are used as the three nodes of the triad; all of them represent
individuals (or groups of individuals). For simplicity, throughout the thesis the term like
(dislike) is used to describe a positive (negative) relationship.

Figure 10: The eight possible triples that can exist in an undirected network. Adopted
from (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 224)
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The top row of Figure 10 consists of balanced triples. A triple is balanced if the
product of the cycle (a sequence of nodes and lines that are each distinct except for
having the same starting and ending node) in each triple is positive. A triple with three
positives or one positive and two negatives is balanced. If a triple has all positive
relationships, then there is balance because everyone likes each other resulting in
minimal tension. When there are two negative relations and a positive relation, there is
balance because the two actors that like each other dislike the third actor and the third
actor dislikes both other actors. The bottom row of Figure 10 consists of unbalanced
triples. This is easily identified because the product of the cycle of the three
relationships (two positives and a negative and three negatives) results in a negative
value. Heider’s presentation suggested an explanation on what would happen within an
unbalanced triple:
If no balanced state exists, then forces towards this state will
arise. Either the dynamic characters will change, or the unit relations will
be changed through action or through cognitive reorganization. If a
change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce tension.
(1946, pp. 107-108)
If one actor likes the other two, but they do not like each other, there is tension within
the group. It is likely that enough stress will be put on the relationships to cause one of
them to change in either of two ways. The negative relationship could turn positive
resulting in three positive relationships and balance. The other option is that the actor
with two positive relations may have to choose which friend it likes better and team
with that friend against the third. This action would result in two negatives and a
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positive, putting the triple into a balanced state. In the case where all three actors
dislike each other, instability occurs and over time it is likely that two actors will join
against the third actor resulting in a balanced triple.
Harary (1953) and Cartwright and Harary (1956) expanded the structural balance
concept using graph theory to mathematically explain Heider’s concepts. Cartwright
and Harary (1956) enabled Heider’s concepts to be applied to units containing more
than three entities. Building on the concept of a triple being balanced if the product of
the cycle is positive, Cartwright and Harary defined a signed graph as being balanced if
all of its cycles are balanced. The example in Figure 11, taken from Cartwright and
Harary (1956), demonstrates how the seven cycles in graphs a and b are all positive,
making those graphs balanced. Graphs c and d are not balanced because they contain
at least one cycle that is negative, for example the cycles h-j-k-h in graphs c and d are
negative (as are other cycles).
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Figure 11: Four signed graphs containing four points and six lines each. Structures a
and b are balanced but c and d are not balanced (Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p. 284).
Dashed lines represent negative relations and solid lines represent positive relations.
Balance theory is widely applicable to many areas of social science. It has been
applied to international relations (Harary, 1961)(Moore, 1978), consumer behavior
(Woodside, 2001), (Russell & Stern, 2006), (Roy, Gammoh, & Koh, 2012), and supply
chain and logistics (Carson, Carson, Knouse, & Roe, 1997) to cite a few. As more signed
social network data has become available in recent years, analysis has been conducted
using large signed data sets from Epinions, Slashdot Zoo, Wikipedia and other websites
to evaluate and predict signed relations. Guha et al. (2004) were the first to develop an
approval of balance theory to evaluate a person’s trust/distrust relationships and
predict whether he will trust/distrust others in the network. This propagation of trust
creates a wider trust network through the notion that the friend of my friend is also my
friend, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my friend is my enemy, and
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the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The literature review in Section 2.8 provides a
detailed list of sources where balance theory is used to evaluate signed network data.

2.6 Subsets within a Signed Network
2.6.1 Two Subsets in a Balanced Signed Graph.
If all cycles within the graph need to be identified and calculated to determine
structural balance, then large graphs can quickly become computationally challenging
problems. For this reason, it may be easier to determine if a graph is balanced through
other methods. Cartwright and Harary also defined a signed graph as being balanced “if
and only if all paths joining the same pair of points have the same sign” and “if its points
can be separated into two mutually exclusive subsets such that each positive line joins
two points of the same subset and each negative line joins points from different subsets
(Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p. 286).” Using this method, a balanced graph can be
partitioned into two subsets allowing for an easier determination if the graph is
balanced or not. See Figure 11b for an example of a balanced graph that is divided into
two mutually exclusive subsets (i,j,k is one and h is the other). It should be noted that
sometimes one of the subsets of a balanced graph is empty, as is the case of the graph
in Figure 11a. Additionally, a visual inspection of a balanced graph may not be as
obviously balanced as the example in Figure 11b.
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2.6.2 Identifying More than Two Subsets of a Signed Graph.
Davis (1967) built on Cartwright and Harary’s observations that a balanced graph
can be split into two subsets after observing that in reality signed graphs could often be
split into more than two subsets. Davis defined a clustering as two or more subsets of a
signed graph. He then proved that for any signed graph S, “S has a clustering if and only
if S contains no cycle having exactly one negative line (Davis, 1967, p. 181).”
Additionally, “two points are in the same subset if and only if they are joined by an allpositive path (Davis, 1967, p. 182).” For example in Figure 11 graphs a, b and d, there
are no cycles with exactly one negative line. Therefore, these graphs are balanced and
can be divided into subsets. To determine the subsets, search for positive paths
between points. The only positive path in graph b is i-j-k-i therefore i, j, and k are in one
subset and h is in another. Graphs a and d are both examples where one of the subsets
are empty. Graph c cannot be divided into subsets because it has at least one cycle with
one negative line (i-h-j-i or k-h-j-k). If a graph, when divided into k subsets, is balanced,
then it is said to be k-balanced or a weakly balanced network. Graph d is 3-balanced
because i and h are in one subset and j and k are each in their own subset. Nodes i and
h are determined to be in the same subset because they have a positive connection.
Unfortunately, when working with real data, networks are rarely perfectly
balanced and therefore are unable to be neatly divided into subsets. To account for
this, other methods for clustering groups of actors into subsets with similar
characteristics are required. The general clustering problem is an optimization problem
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to partition a graph C into sub units C = {C 1 , C 2 , …, C k } where the minimum distance is
found between clusters. The farther the distance between two clusters, the bigger the
difference between the groups. Groups that have a small distance between them are
more closely related than groups that are farther away. Distance can be measured in
many different ways, but common methods are variations of the Minkowski distance
(the Manhattan, Euclidean, and Chebyshev) and Mahalanobis distance measures. These
methods use different mathematical techniques to calculate between the centers of
clusters C i and C j . There is a large amount of literature dedicated to the field of cluster
analysis and there are many heuristics and algorithms used to partition data into like
groups. The two most common methods of clustering are partitioning and hierarchical.
These methods are introduced in the following two sections. A review of clustering
techniques of weakly balanced networks in the literature is discussed in section 2.8.
2.6.2.1 Partitioning Methods.
A partitioning method constructs k clusters, or subsets, from the nodes. The
analyst may know that the nodes need to be divided into k number of subsets or
multiple k can be found to find the most optimal solution. Each subset must contain at
least one actor and each actor can only belong to one subset (Kaufman & Rousseeuw,
1990, p. 38). Due to these constraints, the number of subsets must be less than or
equal to the number of actors, k ≤ n. The difficulty with clustering via the partitioning
method is that the number of partitions is equal to the second-order Stirling number
shown in Equation 1 (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 135):
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As n and k increase, the number of possible partitions becomes very large.
Therefore, enumeration of all possible options where k is large (generally greater than
12) becomes a computationally difficult problem.
2.6.2.2 Hierarchical Methods.
Hierarchical algorithms conduct a series of partitions in a graph from k=1 (all
actors in one group) to k=n (all actors form their own groups). The algorithm steps
through the process by dividing the graph into two groups. It next divides one of those
two groups into another group, forming three groups. The approach then takes one of
the three groups and splits it. It continues until all actors are completely partitioned
from each other. Some hierarchical algorithms work in the opposite sequence, starting
with a completely segmented group and systematically grouping actors together. This
type of clustering does not allow for corrections to be made. For example, no group can
be split up if they are put together in a previous step, even if it would result in a better
clustering. This allows hierarchical methods to be computationally much quicker than
partitioning methods, but can limit the accuracy of the clusters (Kaufman & Rousseeuw,
1990, p. 45).
2.6.3 Blockmodeling.
“Blockmodeling is best viewed as a set of general tools for clustering social actors and
social relations in meaningful ways (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 131).”
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Models that simplify and explain a complex network without losing important
information are valuable. A blockmodel provides this capability by presenting a network
in a way that highlights the positions and roles of the actors within the network.
Blockmodels were first developed by White, Boorman and Breiger (1976). Blockmodels
consist of a partition of actors in the network into discrete subsets (positions). Each
position has a unique relationship to each other position within the network
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 395).
2.6.3.1 Blockmodeling Displays.
A blockmodel can be displayed many ways; by a reduced graph, by a matrix, or
by an image matrix (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 169). A reduced graph
combines each subset of actors into a node and redraws the graph using the condensed
number of nodes. This presents a less cluttered illustration of the dynamics between
the different subsets within the network. See Figure 12 for the reduced graph of Figure
11b.

i
i,j,k

h
k

h

j

Figure 12: Figure 11b on the left and its reduced graph on the right. The reduced
graph combines three nodes with the same relationships into one node, making the
graph less complex. Dashed lines represent negative relations and solid lines
represent positive relations.
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A matrix can be used to show a blockmodel by rearranging the signed adjacency
matrix so that subsets of similar actors are grouped together along both axes of the
matrix. Once similar actors are grouped, lines dividing the subsets are drawn in both the
horizontal and vertical directions. This delineates the relationships of the subsets into
blocks. Each block represents how the two groups relate. If there are all ones and zeros
in a block (positive block), then the subgroups in that row/column have all positive (or
null) relations. If there are all negative ones and zeros in a block (negative block) then
the subgroups in that row/column have all negative (or null) relations. If there are all
zeros in a block, then there is no relation between the subgroups in the rows/columns
of that block. A blockmodel of a balanced signed network consists of positive blocks on
the diagonal blocks and negative blocks off the diagonal (Ferligoj, Doreian, & Batagelj,
2011, p. 438).
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Figure 13: The matrix representing the network in Figure 12 is on the left and the
image matrix on the same network is on the right. The matrices have lines separating
the blocks and displaying the two subsets within the network.
An image matrix displays a blockmodel in a similar way that a matrix does. The
difference is that the image matrix does not use zeros, ones and negative ones. The
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image matrix uses colors (black for positive, red for negative, and white for zero is
commonly used in grouped ordinal data) or images (often X’s, O’s and blank to
represent ones, negative ones, and zeros respectively). The image matrix allows for the
analyst to visually detect where inconsistencies exist easier than in a normal matrix.
2.6.3.2 Conventional Blockmodeling.
Conventional blockmodeling partitions actors based on the structural or regular
equivalence of the actors. Two actors are structurally equivalent if they are connected
exactly the same way to other actors in a network. Regular equivalence is a more
general form of structural equivalence grouping actors that are in the same hierarchy. A
formal definition for both can be found in Generalized Blockmodeling(Doreian, Batagelj,
& Ferligoj, 2005, p. 172). Structurally equivalent actors can be grouped together within
the signed adjacency matrix. The set of relations from actors in group C i to all actors in
C j forms a block. Given k different clusters, the matrix can be sectioned into k2 blocks.
There are k(k-1) off diagonal blocks which contain ties between blocks (Ferligoj, Doreian,
& Batagelj, 2011). Conventional blockmodeling converts network data into
(dis)similarity matrices that are then clustered based on structural equivalence using
one of the many clustering algorithms.
2.6.3.3 Generalized Blockmodeling.
Doreian et. al. (2005) developed generalized blockmodeling to work directly with
the data (instead of transforming it), loosen the restrictions on conventional
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blockmodeling allowing for more block types, and use a criterion function to measure
the fit of the data (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, pp. 25-26). Since generalized
blockmodeling works directly with the data, it does not have to compute (dis)similarity
matrices which sometimes do not equate the data well in terms of structural
equivalence. Furthermore, in using a criterion function, generalized blockmodeling
allows for a measure for how well the blockmodel fits the data. This is beneficial in
evaluating and comparing different blockmodels. See Chapter Six of Generalized
Blockmodeling (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005) for more information on the
differences between conventional and generalized blockmodeling.
2.6.3.4 Relaxed Blockmodeling.
Doreian and Mrvar (2009) outline a more wide-ranging approach to signed
generalized blockmodeling through relaxed blockmodeling, allowing for both positive
and negative blocks to appear anywhere on the blockmodel. Generalized
blockmodeling allows positive blocks only on the diagonal and negative blocks only off
the diagonal. The relaxed approach is based on the theory that there are other forces
outside of structural balance theory that contribute to the clustering of actors within a
network. This approach still allows for structural balance theory (by letting positive
blocks still appear on the diagonal and negative blocks off the diagonal), but also allows
other options. For example, in real world networks, some actors (particularly
mediators) are universally liked, despite the division of actors predicted by social
balance theory. Some of the relationships of these actors would be categorized as
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inconsistent in generalized blockmodeling, but would be allowed in relaxed
blockmodeling. “Differential popularity, differential receipt of negative ties, mediation
blocks and actors with mutual negative ties can all be identified (Doreian & Mrvar,
2009)” through Relaxed Blockmodeling.

2.7 Measuring Imbalance in Signed Networks
Since most signed networks are not exactly k-balanced, it is necessary to
measure how imbalanced a signed network is when divided into k partitions. Cartwright
and Harary determined that the degree of balance of a signed graph is the “ratio of the
number of positive cycles to the total number of cycles (Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p.
288).” If G is a signed graph, then b(G) is the degree of balance of G and is calculated in
Equation 2.

b(G )=

# positive cycles
# total cycles

Equation 2

Since the number of positive cycles can go from zero to the total number of cycles, b(G)
can vary between zero and one. If b(G) is equal to one, then the graph is balanced. One
must take into account the structure of the signed graph in evaluating the value of b(G).
In Figure 11, the balance of graphs a and b are b(a) = b(b) = 7/7 = 1, since there are
seven balanced cycles and seven total cycles in each graph. This indicates both a and b
are balanced graphs. In graph c, b(c) = 5/7, since there are five positive cycles and two
negative cycles. In graph d, b(d) = 3/7 because three positive cycles (i-j-h-i, i-h-k-i, and ij-h-k-i) are in the graph. Therefore graphs c and d are both unbalanced, but graph c is
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more balanced than graph d. This ratio provides a method to measure imbalance in a
network, but requires that all cycles be tested for balance. Testing all cycles can be a
lengthy process depending on the size of the network.
Harary (1959) defined an additional way to measure imbalance by calculating the
number of ties that need to be removed in order for the network to come into balance.
This deletion-minimal set is equal to the negation-minimal set, the number of ties
whose signs must be changed for the network to come into balance (Harary, Norman, &
Cartwright, 1965, p. 350). Doreian and Mrvar (2009) created an algorithm to calculate
this second type of measurement as well as a partitioning procedure for signed
networks. Their algorithm calls for the calculation of all of the negative ties within
subsets and the positive ties between subsets. These two types of relations are
inconsistent with a balanced network and therefore need to be negated or deleted,
according to the second method of calculating imbalance, in order for the network to
become balanced. If a blockmodel does not fit the data perfectly, then there will be
inconsistencies within the blockmodel. Inconsistencies are defined as instances in which
an empirical blockmodel is inconsistent with the specified blockmodel (Doreian,
Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 23). These inconsistencies can be used to determine how
well the data and the blockmodel fit using a criterion function.

2.8 Partitioning Signed Networks
A number of different techniques to determine clusters or communities within
weakly balanced signed networks (also known as k-balanced networks, see section
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2.6.2) have been recently developed. Doreian and Mrvar, in a 1996 article, present a
local search strategy, starting with a random partition into k sets and moving to
neighbor states to find the local optimal value of the criterion function. This method is
discussed in more detail in section 2.8.1 and is the primary method used in this thesis.
In Chapter 10 of their book, Generalized Blockmodeling (2005), Doreian, Batagelj, &
Ferligoj expound on the techniques and provide many examples from common SNA
datasets. The most relevant example to this thesis is the analysis of Read’s cultural data
on the tribes in the Central Highlands of New Guinea (Read, 1954) in which they
partitioned the network of tribes and identified a specific tribe that had unique
relationships.
The following are other examples in the literature that draw on structural
balance principles to cluster actors within a network using various mathematical
techniques. Yang, Cheung, & Liu (2007) developed an agent-based heuristic to conduct
a random walk on a signed graph to determine which community a node belongs.
Bansal, Blum, & Chawla (2004) and Demaine, Emanuel, Fiat, & Immorlica (2006) used
approximation algorithms to conduct correlation clustering on signed graphs to
minimize the disagreements and maximize the agreements between groups. Kunegis,
Lommatzsch, & Bauckhage (2009) analyzed the social network Slashdot Zoo using a
clustering coefficient to evaluate the global network characteristics, centrality and
popularity measures to evaluate node characteristics, and distance and similarity
measures to evaluate link characteristics. Kunegis, Schmidt, Lommatzsch, Lerner, De
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Luca, & Albayrak (2010) use the spectral clustering algorithm to identify the top k
eigenvetors of the signed graph Laplacian and run the k-means algorithm to calculate
the clusters. Chiang, Whang, & Dhillon (2012) extend this work to better apply to the kway clustering problem when k is greater than two. Hsieh, Chiang, & Dhillon (2012) use
matrix completion methods to fill in unknown relations within a network and then use a
spectral clustering algorithm to determine the groups. Anchuri & Magdon-Ismail (2012)
propose a two step spectral approach to iteratively optimize modularity and frustration.
2.8.1 Relocation Method.
Doreian and Mrvar (1996) developed a local search heuristic to determine the
best clustering option for network data called the relocation method. This method uses
a criterion function to determine how well a blockmodel fits the data. The criterion
function is then minimized to determine the local minimal optimum. The criterion
function is defined as:
𝑃(𝑪∗ ) =

𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑪𝜖Ф𝑃(𝑪)

Equation 3

where C is a clustering of a given set of units U, Ф is the set of all possible clusters, and
P:Ф→ R is the criterion function:
𝑃(𝑪) = 𝑁 + 𝑃

Equation 4

where N is the number of negative ties within subsets and P is the number of positive
ties between subsets. A more general criterion function that allows the analyst to
weight positive or negative inconsistencies differently is:
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𝑃(𝑪) = 𝛼𝑁 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑃

Equation 5

where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α = 0.5, N is weighted the same as P and Equation 5 is the same as
Equation 4. If α < 0.5, then positive inconsistencies are weighted more. If α > 0.5, then
negative inconsistencies are more highly weighted. The calculations in this thesis are
conducted with α = 0.5 because little research has been conducted on the effects or
reasons to weight one type of inconsistency higher than the other. However, if such
knowledge exists for a given group of interest, α could be varied to correspond to
mission objectives.
In order to identify the least amount of inconsistencies, the criterion function
must be minimized. Doreian and Mrvar recommend using the relocation method to
locate the local optimum. Since this solution only finds the locally best solution and not
the global optimum, the procedure must be repeated a large number of times to ensure
that different initial clusters are used to gain confidence that the minimum solution to
the criterion function is the actual global optimum. The relocation method first
defined by Doreian, Batagelj, and Ferligoj in Generalized Blockmodeling (2005, p. 150)
and clarified by Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, and Steinley (2011):
1. Select a value of k.
2. Randomly determine an initial clustering, C, with k clusters.
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3. Repeat: If, in the neighborhood of the current clustering C, there exists a
clustering C’ such that P(C’) < P(C), then move to C’. The neighborhood of a
clustering C is determined by two transformations:
(a) moving a vertex from one cluster to another cluster and
(b) interchanging two nodes between different clusters. This process is
repeated many times (in the order of many thousands) to minimize the
risk of reaching only a local minimum rather than a global minimum.
4. Repeat the whole procedure for different values of k.

2.8.1.1 Partitioning Weakly Balanced Networks.
In order to identify if a network is weakly balanced (k-balanced), the criterion
function needs to be tested for all values of k. When the Doreian/Mrvar algorithm
determines that P(C) = 0 when C k is tested, then a network is weakly balanced at k.
Since there are no inconsistencies when clustered into k subgroups, the network is kbalanced. If inconsistencies exist for all k where 0 ≤ k ≤ n (n = total number of nodes),
then the network is not k-balanced.
2.8.1.2 Partitioning Imbalanced Networks.
In reality, most signed networks are not k-balanced. In non-k-balanced
networks, the criterion function will be greater than zero for all k. To find the best
partition of an imbalanced network, the lowest value of the criterion function is found.
Doreian, Batagelj, and Ferligoj (2005, p. 305) prove that in all signed networks, there will
be a unique lowest value for the criterion function. This value will occur for partitions
2-51

with a single number of subgroups or for adjacent partitions in generalized
blockmodeling. For example, the criterion function will decrease as increasing values of
k are tested. The criterion function will reach a minimum and then begin to increase.
The minimum value could be at one or a series of multiple k’s. However, in relaxed
blockmodeling, the criterion function decreases as k increases (Doreian & Mrvar, 2009).
The relocation method is easy to use and has a fast computational time, but does not
guarantee to find the optimal solution because it uses a local instead of a global search.
The risk of finding a non-optimal solution can be mitigated by conducting the local
search many times from different partitionings.
Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, and Steinley (2011) present a branch-and bound
approach to address the problems with the relocation method, such as it may not find
the optimal global partition or all the optimal partitions. While the branch-and-bound
method does produce an optimal solution, in large problems it can result in long
computation times. The relocation method can produce optimal or near optimal
solutions (likely optimal, but undemonstrated in networks of k>30) in any size network
with minimal computational difficulty (Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, & Steinley, 2011).

2.9 Social Network Analysis Metrics of Signed Networks
Section 2.7 demonstrated how to measure how balanced a signed network is by
taking a ratio of the positive cycles over the total number of cycles or by measuring the
minimum inconsistencies in a network. While these methods are good when comparing
networks or evaluating the whole network, often analysts are more interested in what
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roles individual actors are playing within the network. The Social Network Analysis
metrics discussed in this section provide a way to assess individual actors within a
network.
2.9.1 Centrality.
There are many centrality measures that are common within SNA, Wasserman
and Faust (1994) provide a good explanation in Chapter Five of their book. However,
most centrality measures are not applicable to signed networks because, depending on
the formula, calculations with negative numbers can give erroneous results. When not
applicable to signed networks, the measures can usually be applied to the unsigned
adjacency matrix (by taking the absolute value) or to an adjusted matrix that considers
just positive relations. However, care must be taken to ensure that applying centrality
to these different matrices is justified. If applied haphazardly, centrality metrics will not
provide the analyst with meaningful results. Eigenvector centrality and likes minus
dislikes are two possible methods for determining the centrality or prestige within
signed networks. Kunegis et al. (2009) identify additional popularity and centrality
measures that can be used to evaluate signed social networks. However, many of them
are highly correlated.
2.9.1.1 Degree Centrality.
In any network, the degree of a node n, d(n), is the measurement of how many
connections actor n has. It is calculated by summing the ties an actor has to other actors
or by summing the row or column of the adjacency matrix (Wasserman & Faust, p. 163).
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Since a directed network has a direction for the flow of influence it contains indegrees
and outdegrees. An indegree is calculated by summing the number of ties coming from
other actors or by summing the number of 1’s in the column of the adjacency matrix.
Likewise, an outdegree is calculated by summing the number of ties going from an actor
to all actors it influences or by summing the number of 1’s in the row of the adjacency
matrix (Wasserman & Faust, p. 126). The degree of an actor in a network can be an
indication to how central that actor is to the network. In general, the higher the degree,
the more connected the actor is within the network. Sometimes, as is the case in dark
social networks, an actor with high degree centrality may not tell the whole story. For
example someone with high degree centrality could be a highly influential actor, a
messenger that has contact with a larger percentage of actors, or simply someone that
practices poor operational security. Assessing the degree of an actor in a signed
network can be done several ways. One can calculate the positive degree, the negative
degree, or the positive minus the negative degree of actors within the network. The
positive degree will tell how many friends an actor has. The negative degree will tell
how many enemies an actor has and the positive minus the negative will tell if the actor
has more friends than enemies within the network. Additionally, the ratio of positive
(or negative) degree over the total degree (both positive and negative) will denote the
proportion of friends (enemies) the actor has within the network. The ratio measure
provides a better indication of how popular an actor is based on the relations that he or
she has. This makes the ratio measure a potentially preferable approach to use in
sparse networks than the positive minus negative measure.
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2.9.1.2 Eigenvector Centrality.
Eigenvector Centrality is a measure of how central an actor is to the network
based both on how many connections the actor has and the influence of connected
actors. This measurement attempts to measure both the number of connections as well
as how important the connections are. The most common way to measure eigenvector
centrality was developed by Bonacich (1972) and is given in Equation 6. This equation
provides the centrality of the actor, x, by using the largest eigenvalue, λ, of a symmetric
adjacency matrix, A.

x=

1

λ

Equation 6

Ax

Bonacich and Loyd (2004) show eigenvector centrality can be used to examine
the impacts of both positive and negative relationships on status. Eigenvector centrality
when applied to signed networks can increase the status of a node by having a positive
connection to a high status node or a negative connection to a low status node. It can
also decrease the status of a node by having a negative connection to a high status node
or a positive connection to a low status node. Unfortunately, eigenvector centrality can
only be used with non-directional data because a symmetric adjacency matrix is needed
to ensure a positive eigenvalue (Bonacich & Lloyd, 2004).
2.9.1.3 Betweenness Centrality.
Betweenness Centrality measures how central an actor is to the network by
measuring its connection between other actors. If an actor is between two actors, then
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it can influence the communication between the actors it connects. Freeman (1977, p.
37) defined g jk as the number of geodesics, or arcs, linking n j and n k . He defined g jk (n i )
is the number of geodesics linking n j and n k that contain n i . With the assumption that
all geodesics are equally likely to be chosen for the path linking n j and n k , Freeman
accurately quantified the betweenness centrality with Equation 7. Betweenness
centrality can only be used on nonnegative edge weights. Applying it to the unsigned
adjacency matrix is possible, but provides little insight. Since positive relations connect
friends, the betweenness centrality should only be used to evaluate the positive
relations of the network. However, this does not take into account negative relations
and therefore disregards potential meaningful data within the network.

CB (ni ) = ∑ g jk (ni ) / g jk

Equation 7

j <k

2.9.2 Prestige.
Many different Social Network Analysts have used different terms to describe
the importance of actors within the network. Centrality is a widely used term, but
status, prestige, importance and prominence are other terms used to describe key
actors. These terms, while being similar, often have a variety of definitions. Wasserman
and Faust define prestige as being a measure within a directional network that
evaluates an actor’s influence over the network based on who they have influence over
(by evaluating the indegrees of the actor) (Wasserman & Faust, pp. 174-175). The
simplest measure of prestige is the total indegrees of each actor, or degree prestige,
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P D (n i )=d I (n i ). When standardized to equal a number between zero and one,
P D ’(n i )=d I (n i )/(g-1) (Wasserman & Faust, pp. 202-203). In a signed network with
grouped ordinal data (-1, 0, 1), a common measure for centrality is a popularity
measurement associated with the number of likes and dislikes. As discussed in the
degree centrality section, a node is observed and the number of negative arcs is
subtracted from the number of positive arcs providing a signed centrality value. If a
network is directional, then negative indegree arcs are subtracted from positive
indegree arcs to determine this measure of prestige.

2.10 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a history and background of AQIM and the conflict in Mali
and outlines significant social network analysis tools as applied to signed networks and
structural balance theory. This chapter is the foundation on which the methodology in
Chapter Three is developed and provides sufficient detail of the current situation in Mali
to apply the methodology to the case studies in Chapters Four and Five. After a brief
introduction to basic graph theory and social network analysis terminology, structural
balance theory is described. Then, methods for identifying subgroups within a signed
network are outlined. If a network is balanced, it can be divided perfectly into two
groups with no inconsistencies. A network is weakly balanced (k-balanced) when it can
be perfectly divided into k subgroups without any inconsistencies. Weakly balanced
networks have no cycles that have exactly one negative edge. Nodes that are positively
connected to each other are in the same subgroup in a k-balanced network. Two
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methods for measuring imbalance in signed networks help to quantify how balanced an
unbalanced network is. The existing literature for clustering signed social networks is
covered and one particular method, Doreian and Mrvar’s relocation method, is
described in detail. Centrality measures applicable to signed data are defined as well.
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3 Partitioning and Assessing Signed Social Networks
3.1 Introduction
Having highlighted in Chapter Two the major contributions to signed social
networks within the literature, this chapter provides a methodology to partition and
assess the signed networks. Data requirements and limitations are initially discussed.
Measuring balance, the partitioning of signed networks, and evaluating the partitions
are the key topics within the methodology. Two different partitioning concepts,
generalized blockmodeling and relaxed blockmodeling, are discussed.

3.2 Data Requirements and Limitations
Data to populate the model is as important as the model itself. Unfortunately,
when modeling dark networks, there is an inherent risk in not having complete data due
to the secret nature of the organizations. Additionally, social network models are just
that, models, meaning that they are abstractions of the real thing. Even when all
relevant information is known about a network, decisions of what to include in the
model and what to leave out are often necessary. This creates a level of uncertainty as
to how well the model represents the real life situation. Any decisions based on the
model must be made while considering both the assumptions of the model and other
information known but not represented in the model.
Data can be collected in a number of different ways. It can be gathered in
traditional ways including questionnaires, interviews, observations, historical records,
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and experiments. In addition, it may be collected via national technical means and
traditional intelligence practices. Once data is collected, it is necessary to review the
data to ensure that it meets the requirements for the model. In this case, we require
data that reflects each relationship as positive, negative or neutral {1, -1, or 0}. If data
exists in another form, it must be converted into this form. If the data calculates a
relationship as a probability of having a positive (negative) relationship, a cut off value, β
is required. Any probability below β would be a null relationship, reflected as a zero.
Any probability at or above β is a one (or negative one). This method converts
probability of having a positive or negative relationship into the appropriate format.
Sometimes multiple binary datasets can be combined to make a grouped ordinal
dataset. In this case, one binary dataset represents positive relations where another
dataset represents negative relations. This data can be converted to the appropriate
format by multiplying the negative relations adjacency matrix by negative one and
adding the two matrices.

3.3

Partitioning Signed Networks with Generalized Blockmodeling
3.3.1 Partitioning a Balanced Network.
Once data is collected and properly formatted, it can then be analyzed to

determine whether the network is balanced or not. One way to identify a balanced
network is to determine that all of its cycles are positive (Cartwright & Harary, 1956).
The sign of a cycle is calculated by taking the product of the edges. The easiest negative
cycle to identify in a network graph is often one with only one negative line. Even if only
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one negative cycle exists in a large network of all other positive cycles, the network is
unbalanced. Guaranteeing a network is balanced is difficult in large networks because
all cycles need to be identified and found positive in order to be sure it is balanced.
Therefore, it is often easier in large networks to use a heuristic to check if a network is
balanced.
The Doreian/Mrvar heuristic uses an optimization method to determine the best
clustering option for network data. This method, called the relocation method, uses a
criterion function, P(C), to determine how well a blockmodel fits the data. P(C) = N+P
where N is the number of negative ties within subsets and P is the number of positive
ties between subsets. This criterion function was developed based on social balance
theory and any value that is either a positive tie between subsets or a negative tie
within a subset is defined as an inconsistency. The criterion function is then minimized
to determine the local minimal optimum. Finding the partition with the least number of
inconsistencies identifies the most balanced network possible with the given
relationships. Since the relocation method identifies a local optimal value, the minimum
criterion function is repeatedly calculated to verify the minimum local optimal value is
found. This calculation is done for all values of k from one to n, the number of actors in
the network. The heuristic is presented in the following steps (Doreian, Batagelj, &
Ferligoj, 2005, p. 150):
1. Select a value of k.
2. Randomly determine an initial clustering, C, with k clusters.
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3. Repeat: If, in the neighborhood of the current clustering C, there exists a
clustering C’ such that P(C’) < P(C), then move to C’. The neighborhood of a
clustering C is determined by two transformations:
(a) moving a vertex from one cluster to another cluster and
(b) interchanging two nodes between different clusters. This process is
repeated many times (in the order of many thousands) to minimize the
risk of reaching only a local minimum rather than a global minimum.
4. Repeat the whole procedure for different values of k.

If all of the cycles have been found to be positive or the minimum criterion
function of the relocation method is equal to zero for some value k, then the network is
balanced and can be partitioned without any inconsistencies into k subsets. This
partition completely supports structural balance theory and there is little to no tension
within the network. This type of network is the ideal situation when modeling people or
groups of people. However, this type of situation rarely exists in large, real-life
networks. If the minimum criterion function is greater than zero, the network is
imbalanced. The next section describes how to partition imbalanced networks.
The relocation method can be quickly calculated using PAJEK software (Batagelj
& Mrvar, 1996). For this research PAJEK version 3.08 was used for all blockmodeling
and relocation method calculations. The number of repetitions used per k was 1,000
and α = 0.5. Figure 14 provides a flow chart of the entire methodology discussed in this
chapter.
3-4

Figure 14: Methodology Flow Chart
3.3.2 Partitioning Imbalanced Networks.
The Doreian/Mrvar heuristic used in the relocation method is an effective way to
determine the optimal number of partitions for a given network. As previously
discussed, this method quickly solves the criterion function to find the minimum
number of inconsistencies for all partitions one to n. The number of partitions
associated with the smallest criterion function identifies the best way to partition the
network, so that the fewest inconsistencies exist with enough trials. When the network
is partitioned in this way, it is the most balanced it can be without changing any
relations in the network. As an example, if a network consisting of four nodes with the
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relationships shown in Figure 15 is partitioned, none of the partitions result in zero
inconsistencies. Alternatively, this network is determined to be unbalanced because the
cycle A-B-D-A has exactly one negative relationship.

A
B
C
D

a

A B C D
1 -1 -1
1
1
-1
-1
-1 1 -1

b

c

d

e

Figure 15: Notional network matrix and graph with four actors. Dashed lines
represent negative relations and solid lines represent positive relations.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
Unfortunately, occasionally a network will have the same minimum number of
inconsistencies for more than one value of k. Additionally there can be multiple ways a
network can be divided into k partitions with the same minimum number of
inconsistencies. In the unbalanced network in Figure 15, two values of k (k = 2 and k =3)
result in the minimum of one inconsistency (see Table 4). Since the minimum number
of inconsistencies identifies the best partitioning of the network, this network is best
partitioned into either two or three subsets. This particular network can be partitioned
into two different subsets of three making three total options that have the minimum
number (one, in this case) of inconsistencies.
Table 4: Inconsistencies of graph in Figure 15
# of subsets
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function)
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies
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1 2 3 4
3 1 1 2
1 1 2 1

If relationship c is removed, then the network would be balanced with two
subsets {A,B,D} and {C}. If the relationship b is removed, the network would be 3balanced with {A}, {C}, and {B,D} as the subsets. If the relationship e is removed, the
network is again 3-balanced, this time with {A,B}, {C}, and {D} as the subsets. Therefore
three different ways to partition this network have been found to make it as close to
balanced as possible. Using Equation 1, restated here as Equation 8, the total possible
number of partitions of a four actor network can be determined to be fifteen.

S (=
n, k )

k 
1 k
(−1) k −i   i n
∑
k ! i =0
i

Equation 8

The relocation method finds the partitions that best fit a balanced network out of the
total number of partitions. In this simple case it narrows the number of partitions to
investigate further to three from fifteen, allowing one to look deeper at the
relationships in only these three groupings. This is important because as networks
grow, the number of partitions increases exponentially. For example in Chapter Four,
we will observe a seven actor network that can be partitioned 877 different ways,
adding an eighth actor pushes the number up to 4,140, and Chapter Five’s ten actor
network can be partitioned 115,929 different ways. It is therefore necessary to have a
method that quickly identifies a limited number of partitions that are close to balanced
that can be analyzed more closely.
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3.4

Partitioning Signed Networks with Relaxed Blockmodeling
While the generalized blockmodeling approach provides some depth and

understanding to the situation, relaxed blockmodeling approaches the problem
differently, providing different insights. As the name suggests, relaxed blockmodeling
relaxes the requirements of positive blocks being on the diagonal and negative blocks
being off the diagonal. This relaxation allows for exceptions to the social balance theory
in order to identify unique relationships like mediators whose relations would otherwise
be classified as inconsistencies. The relaxed approach is based on the theory that there
are other forces outside of structural balance theory that contribute to the clustering of
actors within a network. This approach still allows for structural balance theory (by
letting positive blocks still appear on the diagonal and negative blocks off the diagonal),
but also allows other options. The relaxed blockmodeling approach should be
conducted if there are multiple solutions for the generalized blockmodeling approach or
if the minimum inconsistency found in the generalized blockmodeling approach is high.
With the relaxed constraints, the relaxed blockmodeling approach may find a better
partition or more logical fit to the network in these situations.
In relaxed blockmodeling the presence of positive and negative blocks and the
criterion function remains the same, except now any signed block can appear anywhere
within the blockmodel. The criterion function for a relaxed blockmodel is most easily
understood as: P(C) = N+P where N is the number of negative ties in positive blocks and
P is the number of positive ties in negative blocks. The same relocation method as used
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in generalized blockmodeling is used in relaxed blockmodeling to determine the number
of inconsistencies. However, different from generalized blockmodeling, in relaxed
blockmodeling the values of P(C k ) decline monotonically as k increases (Doreian &
Mrvar, 2009). Therefore as k gets higher, P(C) approaches zero. When P(C k ) equals zero
the network can be partitioned at k with zero inconsistencies.
When a relaxed blockmodel has zero inconsistencies and there are no negative
blocks on the diagonal, then the graph can be reduced to the identified subsets without
losing any information. However, when there is a negative block on the diagonal where
the actors in the diagonal negative block have the same relations to all other actors, but
dislike each other, reducing would result in the actors in that block being identified as
liking each other. Therefore, if those actors are clustered into the same group to reduce
the graph, the internal relationship between actors in that node needs to be kept track
of as negative.
A mediator, a positive link that can negotiate between two dissenting actors, can
be identified in several different ways. In a relaxed blockmodel with zero
inconsistencies, a negative block on the diagonal where the actors dislike each other,
and a positive block in the same row or column, the mediator(s) is the actor(s) in the
positive block. Additionally, when a relaxed generalized blockmodel has zero
inconsistencies and an actor (or in a reduced graph, group of actors) has more than one
positive non-diagonal block in their column or row, the actor is a mediator between the
actors in the positive blocks. The proof is trivial because there are zero inconsistencies,
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making any actor with more than two non-diagonal positive blocks someone who likes
the actors within those blocks while those actors cannot like each other or they would
be in the same block.

3.5 Evaluating the Partitioned Network
3.5.1 Social Network Measures.
The popularity of an actor in a signed network can be a useful
measurement because a more popular actor is assumed to have more influence within
the network. This thesis uses three different measures to calculate the popularity of
individual actors within the network. The three metrics for evaluating signed networks
are likes minus dislikes, ratio of likes, and eigenvector centrality. Likes minus dislikes is a
quick snapshot of the network by subtracting the dislikes from the likes each actor has
in the network. This will return an integer value. A positive value means the actor has
more friends than enemies in the network, where a negative value means the opposite.
The actors can then be ordered and compared to determine who might have the most
influence within the network.
The second measure, the ratio of positive (or negative) degree over the total
degree (both positive and negative) will denote the proportion of friends (enemies) the
actor has within the network. The ratio measure provides a better indication of how
popular an actor is based on the relations that he or she has. For example, if actor A has
three positive out of four total relations and actor B has one positive out of two
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relations, both will have a likes minus dislikes value of one, but actor A will have a 0.75
ratio and actor B will have a 0.5 ratio. This shows that the ratio measure is a potentially
preferable approach to use in sparse networks than the positive minus negative
measure.
The third measure, eigenvector centrality is a measure of how central an actor is
to the network based both on how many connections the actor has and the influence of
connected actors. This measurement attempts to measure both the number of
connections as well as how important the connections are. Eigenvector centrality
provides the centrality of the actor, x, by using the largest eigenvalue, λ, of a symmetric
adjacency matrix, A. This relationship is shown in Equation 9.

x=

1

λ

Equation 9

Ax

Eigenvector centrality when applied to signed networks can increase the status of a
node by having a positive connection to a high status node or a negative connection to a
low status node. It can also decrease the status of a node by having a negative
connection to a high status node or a positive connection to a low status node.
Unfortunately, eigenvector centrality can only be used with non-directional data
because a symmetric adjacency matrix is needed to ensure a positive eigenvalue
(Bonacich & Lloyd, 2004). In this thesis, eigenvector centrality was calculated using
UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002).
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3.5.2 Evaluating Inconsistencies.
Once the best fit partitioning of the network has been identified, they can be
further examined. One way to do this is by looking at the blockmodels of each of the
partitions and identifying the inconsistencies in each blockmodel. Recall, from section
2.6.3.3, that a positive value in a block off the diagonal and a negative value inside a
diagonal block is an inconsistency in generalized blockmodeling. To determine which
relationships are under the most tension to change, sum the total number of
inconsistencies belonging to each relationship identified from all of the subsets with the
minimum number of inconsistencies. The three blockmodels for the best partitions of
the notional network in section 3.3.2 are shown in Figure 16. Within each blockmodel is
an inconsistency that is highlighted. For this simple example, inconsistencies are found
once in three different relationships. However, if one relationship was found more
often, this relationship would be identified as having more tension and therefore would
be more likely to change.
A B D C
A
1 -1 -1
B
1
D
-1
C

A B D C
A
1 -1 -1
B
1
D
-1
C

A B D C
A
1 -1 -1
B
1
D
-1
C

3 subsets, 1
Inconsistency

3 subsets, 1
Inconsistency

2 subsets, 1
Inconsistency

Figure 16: Blockmodels for notional four actor symmetric network
Suppose that the individuals in our example are Adam, Barb, Chris and Donna (A,
B, C, and D respectively). Adam and Barb are married. Donna and Barb are friends, but
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Barb’s husband, Adam does not get along with Donna. Chris is an acquaintance of Adam
and Donna, but neither of them like him much. Barb and Chris do not know each other.
As discussed previously there are three different ways to partition this network where
each partition has one inconsistency. The far left blockmodel identifies the Adam/Barb
relationship as being inconsistent. Given what is known about the network, the
Adam/Barb relationship is probably the strongest (since they are married) and therefore
is unlikely to change.
The other two blockmodels identify Donna’s relationships with Barb and Adam. It
is likely that one of these two relationships will change to make the network balanced.
One option is that Barb will stop associating with Donna because Adam does not like
her. The other option is that Adam will tolerate (and maybe eventually begin liking)
Donna to preserve Barb’s relationship with her. In all situations Chris is in a group by
himself.
In evaluating the best partition of a network, additional analysis is required (such
as how much one likes/dislikes another) to identify which relationship is most
vulnerable to change. For example, the Adam/Barb relationship may be the most
vulnerable to change if the analyst knows that Adam and Barb have been having marital
problems. On the other hand, if Donna is identified as Barb’s mother, the source of
tension within the network may suddenly make sense. In this case, the Adam/Donna
relationship is one that both parties will likely try to improve to move the network into
balance, resulting in less strife at home. The model does not take these types of
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relationships into account but rather requires SME’s to apply the intangible details of
relationships to identify the appropriate partition when multiple partitions exist. The
model reduces the number of partitions into a manageable amount to evaluate
individually and aids in highlighting relationships that may require more detailed
analysis.

3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides the basic understanding for how a signed network can be
partitioned and evaluated. A small example was provided demonstrating how to
measure imbalance within a network by identifying inconsistencies via generalized
blockmodeling. Relaxed blockmodeling was presented as an alternative to generalized
blockmodeling when there are many minimum P(C) solutions or when there is a high
minimum inconsistency identified in the generalized blockmodeling approach. Once the
best solution or solutions are found by minimizing the criterion function, they should be
evaluated by subject matter experts to identify potential causes for the inconsistencies.
Chapters Four and Five provide case studies that further apply the methodology
described in this chapter.
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4 Mali Militant Groups Case Study Pre-French Intervention
4.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to apply the outlined methodology to seven militant groups in
Mali to identify the alliances of these groups and to determine which relationships are
susceptible to change or which relationships may be mischaracterized by current
understanding. The values assessed in the model presented in this chapter are based on
relationships prior to the 11 January 2013 French involvement in the Malian conflict.
There are 877 different ways to partition a network with seven actors (Equation
1, page 2-41). However, most of these ways, while mathematically possible, do not
make sense based on the known relationships between the actors. Due to the complex
web of relationships, it is often difficult to find a partition that does not misrepresent at
least one relationship. In an unbalanced network there is always a relationship or
relationships that contradicts what two actors would be expected to maintain when
looking at the relationships in the rest of the network. The methodology outlined in
Chapter Three identifies the best possible partitions within the network to minimize
those inconsistencies. The partitions that are found can provide indications to how a
network’s web of relationships may evolve and can provide intelligence analysts
additional insight into the groups or alliances that form. Additionally it can indentify
actors that fill the role as mediators between groups or potentially find misclassified
relationships or erroneous data within the network.
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4.2 Background
Until recently Mali was considered a democratic model in Africa (Aziz, 2013).
However, in March 2012 a military coup ousted Malian President Amadou Toumani
Touré. In the aftermath of the coup, basic governance and security broke down in
Northern Mali allowing for a disgruntled Tuareg movement to rebel against the state.
This movement, initiated by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA) and later co-opted by Islamic extremists, is the most recent in a series of Tuareg
rebellions in Mali. Within the conflict in Northern Mali, there are a number of key
groups that are influential in shaping the events. The relationships between these
actors are explored in order to identify subsets of potential alliances and potential
vulnerabilities.

4.3 Key Actors
The study in this chapter explores the relationships between seven actors: AQIM,
MUJAO, AAD, MNLA, Arab Militias, the Patriotic Forces of Resistance (PFR) and Mali
government affiliated forces in 2012, prior to French involvement on 11 January 2013.
Each of these actors and their relations to each other are discussed in this section.
Section 2.2 has a detailed overview on AQIM and should be referenced for historical,
geographic and cultural significance of AQIM and the region as a whole. Section 2.2.4
provides additional background on some of the key actors affiliated with AQIM (MNLA,
AAD, MUJAO), and whose relationships are analyzed in this chapter. Table 5 provides an
overview of the key actors described in section 4.3.
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Table 5: Key Actors in Northern Mali (Pre-French intervention)
Number Group Ideology
1

MNLA

Secular

2

AQIM

Extreme
Islamic

3

AAD

Extreme
Islamic

4

MUJAO

Extreme
Islamic

5

Arab
Islamic
Militias

6

Malian
Govt

7

FPR

Secular

Goal
A secular, independent
government in Azawad
Establish an Islamic
Caliphate throughout
Muslim world
Establish an Islamic
State of Mali with
Shari'a Law enforced
Establish an Islamic
Caliphate throughout
Muslim world
Defend and protect
there own interests
Regain control of their
territory and defeat the
rebel movement

Regain control of lost
Mali territory and defeat
Secular
the rebel
movement/Revenge

Ethnicity

Area of Operation Like Dislike

Primarily Tuareg

Kidal

3

2,4,5,6

Algerian leadership,
African participants

Timbuktu/
Dispersed across
Northern Mali

3,4

1,6,7

Primarily Tuareg leaders,
other ethnic participants

Kidal/Timbuktu

1,2,4

6,7

Mauritanian leader,
African participants

Gao/Menaka

2,3

1,6,7

Arab

Lere/Timbuktu

6

1,7

Bambara, Peuhl, Senufo,
Songhai, Dogon, Malinke
and others

Mopti, Sevare

Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo,
Bella and others

Originally Gao and
Douentza, moved
south when
Islamists took over
North

5,7 1,2,3,4

6

1,2,3,4,
5

4.3.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a largely secular
group whose goal is to liberate and establish a separate government in the area they
refer to as Azawad, the desert region in Northern Mali. The movement is largely made
up of ethnic Tuareg fighters. There were previously at least three Tuareg rebellions,
fighting Mali for independence. The most recent rebellion, fueled by returning fighters
and weapons from post-Gaddafi Libya, began in January 2012. Members of the Malian
military, unhappy with how the government was handling the rebellion, coordinated a
coup on 22 March. Following the coup, the government forces put up little resistance,
allowing the MNLA, with assistance from extremist Islamic fighters, to gain control over
large portions of Northern Mali. In April 2012 the MNLA issued a declaration of
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independence for Azawad. Shortly after independence, Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO began
enforcing Shari’a law in areas they controlled. The MNLA, in favor of a more tolerant
form of Islamic government, objected to imposing Shari’a on the population. This led to
disagreements between the MNLA and the Islamic extremist organizations. Battles
began to take place throughout Northern Mali with MNLA losing control of much of the
territory to Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012). Once consisting of thousands of
fighters, MNLA’s power seemingly diminished with power and influence shifting to
Ansar Al-Din. As a result, the MNLA reengaged with the Malian government for support
against extremists (Oumar, 2012) and attempted to negotiate with moderate Tuareg
members in Ansar Al-Din to establish a more united Tuareg organization (El Hadi, 2012).
The MNLA has negative relations with AQIM and MUJAO and repeatedly claims
to oppose all terrorists (McGregor, 2012). The relationship between MNLA and Ansar
Al-Din is complicated. Both groups are led by and have active memberships from the
influential Ifoghas Tuareg tribe. This study characterizes the relationship as positive due
to strong bonds that exist between Tuareg members within both organizations. Since
April, the MNLA and Ansar Al-Din have had conflicting relations due to their differences
in ideology, mainly the implementation of Shari’a law (Jacinto, 2012). The MNLA and
Ansar Al-Din have had an off and on relationship since the establishment of both
organizations. They briefly merged in May and both signed an agreement in December
2012 for a ceasefire with the government (Reuters, 2013). However, neither of these
agreements lasted long (the December deal was rescinded by AAD on 3 January 2013).
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FPR, Arab militias, and government militias generally have negative relations with the
MNLA based mostly on ethnic differences that have historically caused conflict and
disagreements.
4.3.2 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Al-Qa’ida affiliated terrorist
organization formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).
On 11 September 2006, Al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced
the merger of GSPC with Al-Qa’ida. In January 2007, the GSPC announced their new
name: Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The name change reflected the evolution of
the organization from a local to a global jihad with the goal of establishing an Islamic
Caliphate and conducting jihad on anyone opposed to their mission. AQIM then began
to target foreign countries and operate outside the borders of Algeria, especially in Mali
and Mauritania (Harmon, 2010, p. 16). In recent years, due in part to Algerian success in
targeting AQIM leadership based in Algeria, AQIM has found the openness of the Sahara
an ideal place to operate. AQIM’s history of smuggling operations within this region has
allowed them to expand relationships with the local population to facilitate their
operations. When the conflict in Northern Mali started, AQIM was positioned to
capitalize on those relationships and use the weapons, money and influence they
possess to enable Islamic extremists to control most of Northern Mali. While it is
unclear the level of interaction between the different extremist organizations, AQIM is
active and involved in Northern Mali. It is closely aligned in ideology to MUJAO and
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Ansar-Al Din while the MNLA, FPR and Malian government militias are opposed to
AQIM.
4.3.3 Ansar Al-Din (AAD).
Ansar Al-Din (“Supporters of Religion” or “Defenders of Faith”) is a new
organization inside Mali led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the leaders in the Tuareg rebellion
in the 1990’s. There are strong indications that Ansar Al-Din is associated with AQIM,
based on their common goal of establishing an Islamic state and the connections of Ag
Ghaly with some of AQIM’s leaders (Metcalf, 2012). Ansar Al-Din fought alongside the
MNLA in Northern Mali, but after taking control of Azawad, the differences between
MNLA and Ansar Al-Din became too great. In the Battle of Gao, on 27 June 2012, Ansar
Al-Din and MUJAO defeated the MNLA and took control of many of the cities in
Northern Mali (BBC News, 2012). Ansar Al-Din and MNLA are both led by individuals
from the Ifoghas Tuareg tribe, making them close despite the conflict. Ansar Al-Din’s
goals differ from the MNLA in that they want Mali to remain united and for Shari’a law
to govern the whole country (BBC News, 2012). Ansar Al-Din appears to represent the
people of Azawad better than any of the other organizations analyzed. It’s make up is
different throughout Northern Mali with Arab, Songhai and other ethnic groups
represented within the organization, especially in areas where those ethnicities make up
the majority of the population, such as Timbuktu (Tanchum, 2012). Being more diverse
can be a strength or a weakness, as it provides them with a wider base, but potentially
more conflicting voices.
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Based on the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, Ansar Al-Din has
positive relations with AQIM, MUJAO, and MNLA. FPR groups and Ansar Al-Din have
negative relations based on ideology and historical ethnic conflicts. Some may argue
that the relation between Ansar Al-Din and the government of Mali should be classified
as negative based on Ansar Al-Din’s current relationships with AQIM and MUJAO and
their statements and actions of implementing Shari’a law throughout Mali. However,
the previous Mali government has a long history of dealing with Ag Ghaly who has a
history of making deals with all parties, therefore this study characterizes this relation as
null (neither positive nor negative). Additionally, Ansar Al-Din has already shown a
willingness to come to the table for negotiations, something that AQIM and MUJAO are
unlikely to do (Reuters, 2013).
4.3.4 The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (French: Mouvement pour
le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest) (MUJAO) is an AQIM off-shoot in West
Africa. The organization is led by Mauritanian national Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou
(a.k.a. Abou QumQum) and is seen by many as a way to expand the mission of AQIM.
Other analysts see the creation of MUJAO as evidence of AQIM splintering due to the
native Algerian leadership’s unwillingness to allow non-Algerians to rise through the
ranks (Cristiani, 2012). MUJAO appears to be made up of mostly Moors and Arab
people from West Africa. MUJAO is closely aligned with AQIM and parts of Ansar-Al Din.
It is in conflict with MNLA, FPR and the Malian government militias. This study classifies
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the relationship between MUJAO and Arab militias as null since they tend to operate in
the same areas and tolerate each other, but they have different backgrounds and
ideologies.
4.3.5 Arab Militias.
Historically Arab militias have operated in the Timbuktu and Gao regions with
the government’s support 4. Arab militias have previously been used by the government
to fight against Tuareg separatists and help protect the northern Arab population during
the previous Tuareg rebellions. Using Arab and Tuareg militias to assist in fighting the
Tuareg rebellions exacerbated long term ethnic problems within and between different
northern communities. Although at times legitimized and even commanded by Malian
army officers, these militias are widely believed to participate in the illegal smuggling
networks that operate throughout Northern Mali. Additionally, these militias both
compete and cooperate with Tuareg and Islamic groups that participate in similar
smuggling activities. This illicit network of smuggling drugs, cigarettes and other goods
has encouraged the establishment of private militias throughout Northern Mali to
protect both legitimate and non-legitimate business interests (van Vliet, 2012). The
Arab Militias have had a generally good relationship with the Malian government. It is
difficult to say what policy the new government, when in place, will take towards these
militias. The Arab militias have historically negative ties to the FPR affiliated groups and
4

“The principal Arab (Moors) groups residing in northern Mali are the Kunta and Telemsi (concentrated in
the Gao region) and the Berabiche (of which a majority reside in Timbuktu, but who are scattered around
the entire region). They formed the backbone of the militant Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA)” (van
Vliet, 2012).
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to the MNLA and most Tuareg groups. Their relation with the Islamic militants is null
because in at least some cases, militias continue to operate throughout their normal
territory and have been able to coexist with the extremists. In some cases, Arab militias
may be participating with certain Islamic extremist groups to achieve like interests.
4.3.6 Mali Government Affiliated Forces.
Mali’s military has historically been “underpaid, poorly equipped, and in need of
rationalization (Library of Congress, 2005)”. Additionally, efforts to incorporate former
Tuareg rebels into the Army created infighting and a struggle for power between the
competing military commanders. Following the coup, the Army that was stationed in
Northern Mali dissolved. Three senior Malian officers still have troops and the desire to
fight to regain Northern Mali. Colonel al-Hajj Gamou is a Tuareg that escaped into Niger
when the Malian army disintegrated in the region. He reportedly has 600 progovernment Tuareg fighters to assist in retaking the north (McGregor, 2012). Colonel
Ould Meydou, an Arab, took refuge in Mauritania and can return to fight with the
approximately 1,000 man Arab force that he commands (McGregor, 2012). Colonel
Didier Dakuo commands approximately 2,000 regular army soldiers with some vehicles
and equipment at the military base in Sévaré, just south of the territory the Islamists
control (McGregor, 2012). These forces remains poorly equipped and suffer from
mistrust, poor discipline and a lack of leadership. Additional Malian military was
disbanded in the aftermath of the coup. Mali has a small Air Force and Navy, but their
equipment is old and poorly maintained (Library of Congress, 2005). The Mali
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government forces (at least some pro-government militias) have existing positive
relations with the Arab militias. The FPR are decidedly pro-government and will support
government forces in any action. Government forces are opposed to the Islamists
occupying Northern Mali including MNLA, Ansar Al-Din, AQIM and MUJAO.
4.3.7 Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR).
Several self-defense militias have operated in Mali since the 1990’s. Although
the Malian government has previously made efforts to crack down on them or
incorporate them into the Army, the recent conflict has produced a large number of
pro-government militias. Recently six of them have joined together to make up the
Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR) (Look, 2012). The two largest groups making up the
FPR are the Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land) and Ganda Iso (Son of the Land) with
estimated forces of 2,000 and 1,300 fighters respectively (Jamestown Foundation,
2012). These militias have received training and logistical support from the Malian
Army, but have not been given arms or a formal role in the attempt to retake the North.
In addition to the Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso, the other groups in the coalition are: the
Liberation Forces of the Northern Regions (FLN), the Alliance of Communities from the
Timbuktu Region (ACRT), the Armed Force against the Occupation (FACO) and the
Thought and Action Circle (CRA) (Jamestown Foundation, 2012). These predominately
Songhai and Peuhl/Fulani groups blame the MNLA and the Islamic groups for raping,
killing and stealing from them in addition to forcing Shari’a law upon them. Human
Rights Watch reports that “these militias, as well as youth groups made up of members
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of northern ethnic groups – the Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo, and Bella – had apparent plans to
“settle scores” with their perceived northern opponents (Human Rights Watch,
December 2012).” There have been reports of “kill lists” being created as well. While
there is a rich history of ethnic coexistence within Mali, there seems to be a genuine
concern that the recent alleged war crimes on all sides, if left unaddressed, could
continue and grow worse if these groups are used by the Malian government to attempt
to retake control over Northern Mali. For all of these reasons, the FPR have positive
relations with the Malian government affiliated forces and negative relations with the
MNLA and each of the extreme Islamist groups. The FPR also generally have negative
relations with the Arab militias due to ethnic differences. The Malian government
historically pits different militias against each other in order to maintain control, thereby
worsening ethnic cleavages (van Vliet, 2012).

4.4 Assessing Relationships between Actors
The previously identified groups and their relationships as discussed in Section 4.3 outline the
background and provide the basis for the analysis. The relations between these groups are shown in the matrix in

Table 6. It should be noted that the relationships in this illustrative example are the
assessment of the author, based on open source literature. Actual relationship values
should be provided by regional, cultural and subject matter experts.
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MNLA
AQIM
AAD
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR

Table 6: Mali actor’s relationship matrix (Pre-French Intervention)

MNLA
AQIM
AAD
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR

-1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1
1 1
-1 -1
1 1
1
-1 -1
-1 1 1
-1 -1
-1
1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 1
1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1

This set of relationships creates a symmetric matrix because all relationships are reciprocated (if actor i
likes actor j, then actor j also likes actor i). The matrix in

Table 6 is displayed in graph form in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Network of relationships from
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Table 6 shown in graph form.

Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj &
Mrvar, 1996)

4.5 Partitioning Actors into subsets
4.5.1 Generalized Blockmodeling.
When looking at the graph in Figure 17, partitioning the network into two
subsets may seem obvious due to the negative lines drawn between Arab militias,
Malian government, and FPR in one group (referred to as group A) and everyone else in
the other (group B). However, when looking at each of these subsets, they are not
balanced because there are three negative relationships within subsets (three
inconsistencies; MNLA-AQIM, MNLA-MUJAO and FPR-Arab Militias). Since initial
partitioning is not balanced, additional partitioning options need to be explored.
Therefore the relocation method can be used to calculate the minimum inconsistency
for all k using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) with α = 0.5. As Table 7 shows, when the
network is partitioned into three or four subsets, the least number of inconsistencies
exist and the network best fits a partition of three or four subsets. In each case, two
inconsistencies exist demonstrating that if two relationships are negated, reversed or
deleted, then the network will become balanced and there will be significantly less
tension. There are two different possible subsets that have two inconsistencies when
partitioning into both three and four subsets. Therefore there are four different
solutions that solve the minimum inconsistencies criterion function.
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Table 7: Minimum inconsistencies for all possible partitions
# of subsets
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function)
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 3 2 2 3 5 6
1 1 2 2 1 6 1

To determine which of the subgroups with the minimum number of
inconsistencies makes the most sense, further analysis is required. Initially the four
blockmodels that provide the minimum answer to our criterion function should be
observed. These blockmodels are shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18: Blockmodels of the four different partitions found by minimizing the
criterion function. (Matrices are symmetric. Highlighted blocks show inconsistencies.)
In evaluating these blockmodels, the inconsistent relationships should be summed for
all of the different blockmodels. This results in MNLA/AAD relationship being identified
in every blockmodel, a total of four times, Arab militias/Mali government relationship
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being identified two times, and Arab militias/FPR and Mali government/FPR each
identified once.
Since the MNLA/AAD relationship is identified as an inconsistency in every
minimum inconsistency blockmodel, it is clearly a relationship that should be studied
further. This relationship should be reevaluated to determine if is misclassified and
should be classified as negative or if it has been found because there is a great deal of
tension and pressure for this relationship to change. Since the people within these two
groups are culturally intertwined, given that these two groups are largely Tuareg, it
seems possible that this relationship will remain positive and not change to negative.
The sticking point in the relationship is that Ansar Al-Din has a much more religious
stance than the MNLA and is linked with AQIM and MUJAO. However, in the event of a
UN backed military mission, Ansar Al-Din may be forced to choose sides. AAD can be
expected to choose the side that they perceive will enable them the most long term
power and influence. This study hypothesized that AAD would denounce violence and
extremism and fall into the subgroup of MNLA. This would make AAD’s relationship
with AQIM and MUJAO negative and keep their relationship with MNLA positive.
The relationship with the second most inconsistencies is the Arab militias/Mali
government relationship. This relationship is in two of the blockmodels, Figure 18b and
Figure 18c. In both of these instances the relationship should be changed from positive
to negative to make it consistent. When this relationship was initially evaluated, it was
rated as positive because of the Malian government’s history of working with Arab
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militias to fight Tuareg insurgencies. However, the Arab militias seem to be complicit
with some extremists and if that continues the Malian government may wish to cut ties
with the Arab militias. Therefore, this relationship is under tension to change and could
be targeted with influence operations to assist in facilitating that change.
The other two relationships were identified as inconsistencies only one time. In
Figure 18a, the relationship that is inconsistent with the blockmodel is between Arab
Militia and FPR. Even though this is identified as a source of tension in this model, it is
not likely to change due to the deep ethnic divide between the two groups. In Figure
18d the relationship that is inconsistent with the blockmodel is between the Malian
government and FPR. While it can be argued that these groups have a negative or null
relationship, they are firmly in the same camp with regards to Northern Mali and the
insurgents there. Therefore, this relationship is not likely to turn negative unless they
take up arms without government permission to avenge past wrongs. The relationship
could turn null if the Malian government addresses some of the FPR’s concerns on
human rights abuses and limits future ethnic conflict escalation. In this case, the FPR
organizations would likely cease to be influential within the network.
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NegativeRelation
Relation
Negative
PositiveRelation
Relation
Positive

Figure 19: Network graphs of the four different partitions. Graphs by author using
Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
If the two relationships with the most inconsistencies were to change, it would create a
balanced network. Since the Arab Militia relationships are currently sparse, the Arab
Militia could be included in either the Islamist extremist or the FPR/Malian government
subsets or form its own. Better intelligence indicating the Arab militias actual relations
with AAD, AQIM and MUJAO would indicate which subset into which they should be
placed.

4-17

MNLA
AAD
AQIM
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR

MNLA
AAD
AQIM
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR
MNLA
AAD
AQIM
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR

MNLA
AAD
AQIM
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt
FPR

1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1
-1 -1
1
-1 -1
-1 -1
-1 -1
1

1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1
-1 -1
1
-1 -1
-1 -1
-1 -1
1

4 Subsets, 0 Inconsistencies

3 Subsets, 0 Inconsistencies

Figure 20: Balanced blockmodels and graphs if the two relationships under the most
tension (AAD/MNLA and Arab Militas/Mali government) were influenced to change.
(Matrices are symmetric)
After the previous analysis was conducted, on 23 January 2013, AAD effectively
split. The splinter group, the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA), led by an important
tribal leader, Algabass Ag Intallah, renounced terrorism and extremism in favor of a
negotiated peace to the Mali conflict (Beaumont, 2013). The goal of IMA is to set up an
autonomous region in Northern Mali, as opposed the MNLA’s initial goal of complete
independence. The establishment of this group is an indication of the pressure the
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AAD/MNLA relationship was under to change. This model identified the tension within
this relationship. While the model does not predict what actions the actors would take,
it did suggest the relationship merited further analysis. In this case, the group splintered
creating new relational dynamics. Chapter Five observes these changes and analyzes in
more detail the actors and relationships of the conflict following French and African
forces involvement and the creation of the IMA.
4.5.2 Relaxed Blockmodeling.
When Relaxed Blockmodeling is conducted on the same network of seven actors,
it is subdivided into five subsets with no inconsistencies. See Figure 21 for the network
graph and Figure 22 for the relaxed fit image matrix showing the subsets and relations
of the relaxed fit. In this partitioning, AQIM and MUJAO are grouped together because
they have the same ties to all other actors and like each other. In addition, FPR and the
Arab Militias are grouped. This grouping is contradictory to social balance theory
(negative block on the diagonal) but is allowed with the relaxed rules. This grouping
makes sense because they have the same relations with all common actors and
mutually dislike each other. When a relaxed blockmodel has zero inconsistencies and
there are no negative blocks on the diagonal, then the graph can be reduced to the
identified subsets without losing any information. However, when there is a negative
block on the diagonal, the actors in the diagonal negative block have the same relations
to all other actors, but dislike each other. Therefore, if those actors are clustered into
the same group to reduce the graph, the internal relationship between actors in that
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node needs to be kept track of as negative. For example, the seven actor network can
be reduced to a five actor network as identified in the relaxed blockmodel. However,
the FPR/Arab Militias grouping would be a negative node since they do not like each
other, but have the same relation to all others. This demonstrates that despite the
historic ethnic tension between the two groups, they actually have common friends and
enemies. This suggests that there may be a basis for cooperation and mutual
understanding between these two historic rivals.
Negative Relation
Positive Relation

Figure 21: Network graph showing the five subsets found by the Relaxed
Blockmodeling method. By author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996).
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Figure 22: Image matrix blockmodeling the seven militant groups into five subsets.
Red is negative and black is positive. By author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996).
A mediator can be identified when Relaxed Blockmodeling has a negative block
on the diagonal and zero inconsistencies. The mediator is identified by finding a positive
block horizontal or vertical to the negative diagonal block. In the current example, the
Malian government affiliated forces have a positive block horizontal and vertical to the
negative diagonal block. The Malian government makes sense as a mediator since both
the FPR and the Arab militias have a positive relation with Malian government affiliated
forces, but dislike each other.

4.6 Additional Social Network Analysis
As discussed in 2.9, other metrics can be used to provide insight on the
composition of signed networks. Three of the most useful metrics to evaluating signed
networks are the popularity measure of likes minus dislikes, ratio of likes over total
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relations and eigenvector centrality. Likes minus dislikes is a quick snapshot of the
network by measuring each actor’s popularity within the network. Popularity of an
actor in a signed network can be a useful measurement because a more popular actor is
assumed to have more influence within the network. The likes minus dislike values and
the ratio of number of likes over total relations for the Malian groups are in Table 8. A
negative value in the likes minus dislikes column means that the actor is disliked more
than they are liked. Positive means they have more friends than enemies. The FPR and
MNLA have the lowest popularity and AAD has the highest. This puts AAD in a position
where they have more influence throughout the network than any other group.
Observe that the top three like minus dislike rankings are the three Islamist groups. One
must look back to the network to determine why these groups are the highest. These
groups have almost identical relationships to the rest of the network (AQIM and MUJAO
are identical) while the rest of the actors in the network have unique relationships. This
suggests that the Islamists are much more united than the other groups. This result is
expected based on the extremist groups working together to control Northern Mali,
while the remaining actors have various negative relations between them.
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Table 8: Popularity measures of actors: Likes minus Dislikes and Ratio of Likes/Total
relations (sorted from highest to lowest)
Militant
Likes minus Ratio: # Likes over
Group
Dislikes Total Relations
AAD
1
0.6
AQIM
-1
0.4
MUJAO
-1
0.4
Arab Militias
-1
0.333
Malian Govt
-2
0.333
FPR
-4
0.167
MNLA
-4
0.167

Eigenvector centrality is another measure of popularity that considers additional
details of a network than just an actor’s first hand relationships. An actor’s centrality
value will increase by having a positive connection to a high status actor or a negative
connection to a low status actor. Likewise, an actor’s centrality will decrease if it has a
negative connection to a high status actor or a positive connection to a low status actor.
The eigenvector centralities for the Malian groups are in Table 9.
Table 9: Eigenvector Centrality (sorted from highest to lowest). Calculations by author
using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002)
Militant Eigenvector
Group
Centrality
AAD
0.465
AQIM
0.404
MUJAO
0.404
MNLA
0.154
Arab Militias
-0.042
FPR
-0.456
Malian Govt
-0.473

Notice that the top three highest rated groups are the same as in Table 8 and
Arab militias and FPR are in roughly the same position as well. The MNLA, which had
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the worst like minus dislike rating, has a positive value for eigenvector centrality. The
MNLA benefits from its positive relation to the most central actor (AAD) and its negative
relations to the two least central actors (FPR and Malian Govt). The Malian government
militias’ popularity changed in the two measurements as well. Its popularity is effected
both by liking lower groups and disliking the higher groups. One interesting thing to
note is that the eigenvector centrality rankings, when grouped, will provide the same
partition as identified via structural balance theory and depicted in Figure 20b; {AAD,
AQIM, MUJAO}, {MNLA}, {Arab Militias}, and {FPR, Malian Govt}.
The techniques in this section identify ways to assess individual actors within the
network. Each actor can be compared to the rest of the network to gauge their
popularity. Popularity can be an indication for how influential an actor is. In all three
measurements AAD was the most popular actor. This observation provides an
indication for why AAD has been growing both in numbers and power throughout
Northern Mali during the last half of 2012. Fighters were leaving MNLA and the FPR and
joining AAD based on the power and influence the group wielded (Boisvert, 2012)
(Jamestown Foundation, 2012).

4.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusions
Using the militant groups in Mali as an example, this chapter demonstrates the
methodology of partitioning and evaluating signed social networks. The model
identifies four different partitions out of 877 that provide the best depiction of how the
groups are interrelated. This methodology allows intelligence analysts the ability to
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focus in on these specific partitions in order to analyze inconsistencies within the
network. It also suggests potential influence targets. Inconsistencies can potentially
identify errors in classification of a relationship or identify relationships that are
vulnerable to change. The relationship that the model found that was most likely to
change in this illustration was the AAD/MNLA relationship. The recent splitting of AAD
into two groups, demonstrates the model identified a relationship that was under
tension and had a high likelihood of changing. In the next chapter new actors are
introduced to the model and the relationships are identified based on more current
events. The new network is then evaluated using the same methodology to draw
conclusions about the actors and their relationships in the new Malian operating
environment.
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5 Mali Militant Groups Case Study Post-French Intervention
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter delineated key actors participating in the conflict in
Northern Mali prior to 11 January 2013. This chapter provides a second illustrative
example to explain how the methodology could be used to decompose and begin to
comprehend a complex relational situation. This example considers the relations of key
actors in Northern Mali over the period of 11 January to 11 February. The two models
are then compared in Chapter Six where conclusions and recommendations are
presented on the methodology and future work.
In the beginning of January, the Islamic extremist forces began moving south,
out of the desert region, into Southern Mali. The provisional Malian government,
unable to stop the militants themselves, asked France for support. The French entered
Mali on 11 January and, after initial loses, began defeating the extremists. By February
all of the main cities of Northern Mali were regained by Malian, French and other forces.
Other than France, the international ground forces are from African nations supported
by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the operation is
classified by the United Nations as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali
(AFISMA). The other major addition to the key actors from the model in Chapter Four is
the creation of the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). The IMA has split off of Ansar
Al-Din and created a separate organization. This chapter adds the three new actors
(French forces, ECOWAS forces, and the IMA) to the model from Chapter Four to assess
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how the intervention has affected the structural balance of key actors within Northern
Mali. Modeling the actors in this way enables analysts to identify the cliques and
subsets within a network, relations vulnerable to change, and potential mediators
between subsets.

5.2 Key Actors
This study explores the relations between ten actors (three new actors and
seven original actors) evaluated in the Chapter Four model. With the involvement of
French and ECOWAS forces as well as the establishment of a new group, the IMA, this
model is expanded to address the added complexity of the situation. The ten key actors
are listed in Table 10. Arab militias and Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR), from the
Chapter Four model, are included in this revised model as well. The Arab militias seem
to be maintaining a low profile. Very little open source information is currently being
released on their involvement in the conflict. Therefore the only relationships that are
assessed on the Arab militias are their cultural and historic negative relations between
themselves and the MNLA and FPR. The FPR relations are assessed to be exactly the
same as the Malian government, as their goals are to defeat the rebellion and support
the government. The relations of the other actors are discussed in subsections 5.2.1
through 5.2.6. An overview of all actors is displayed in Table 10.
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Table 10: Key Actors of Post-French Intervention in Mali
Number Group Ideology
1

MNLA

Secular

2

AQIM

Extreme
Islamic

3

AAD

Extreme
Islamic

4

MUJAO

Extreme
Islamic

5

Arab
Islamic
Militias

6

Malian
Govt

7

FPR

8

French
Forces

9
10

Secular

Secular

Secular

ECOWAS
Secular
Forces
IMA

Islamic

Goal
A secular, independent
government in Azawad
Establish an Islamic
Caliphate throughout
Muslim world
Establish an Islamic
State of Mali with
Establish an Islamic
Caliphate throughout
Muslim world
Defend and protect
there own interests
Regain control of their
territory and defeat the
rebel movement
Regain control of lost
Mali territory and defeat
the rebel
movement/Revenge
Reduce the terrorist
threat in the
region/Regain Mali's
sovereign territory
Reduce the terrorist
threat in the
region/Regain Mali's
sovereign territory
An Islamic Autonomous
region in Northern Mali

Ethnicity

Area of Operation Like Dislike
2,4,5,6,
Primarily Tuareg
Kidal
3,8,9
7
Timbuktu/
Algerian leadership,
1,6,7,8,
Dispersed across 3,4
African participants
9,10
Northern Mali
Primarily Tuareg leaders,
1,2,4,
Kidal/Timbuktu
6,7,8,9
other ethnic participants
10
Mauritanian leader,
African participants

Gao/Menaka

2,3

1,6,7,8,
9,10

Arab

Lere/Timbuktu

6

1,7

Bambara, Peuhl, Senufo,
Songhai, Dogon, Malinke
and others

Mopti, Sevare

Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo,
Bella and others

5,7,8, 1,2,3,4,
9
10

Originally Gao and
1,2,3,4,
Douentza, moved
6,8,9
5,10
south when
Islamists took over

French

All of Mali

1,6,7,
9,10

2,3,4

African

All of Mali

1,6,7,
8,10

2,3,4

Primarily Tuareg

Kidal

1,3,8,
2,4,6,7
9

5.2.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).

With the French and Malian military success in Northern Mali, the once
marginalized MNLA has once again become a key player within the Tuareg community.
They maintain the same relations with the previous actors, disliking AQIM and MUJAO
for terror and extremist reasons, Arab militias and FPR for cultural and historic reasons,
and the Malian military due to a long history of conflict and distrust. The MNLA
continue to have a complicated relationship with AAD. This study still classifies the
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relationship as positive due to the Tuareg ties between the organizations, but the
segmenting of the moderate IMA’s from AAD has resulted in a weaker connection
between the MNLA and AAD. The MNLA has positive ties with the three new actors in
the model. As the AFISMA forces regained control of the cities in Northern Mali, the
MNLA allowed the French to enter, but told the Malian military to stay out of the city of
Kidal (Harding, 2013b). The IMA, like the MNLA, is a Tuareg organization and is likely to
maintain close ties, at least at the leadership level, with the MNLA. The ideological
difference between the two organizations is that the MNLA is secular and the IMA is
Islamic. Both groups appear to be now seeking an autonomous Northern region of Mali
as opposed to the MNLA’s original goal of independence.
5.2.2 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for
Oneness and Jihad in W. Africa (MUJAO).
AQIM and MUJAO maintain the same relations with all of the same actors that
were in the seven actor model of Chapter Four. Both groups like AAD and dislike all
other actors. The new actors are all disliked by AQIM and MUJAO because the
international forces have become involved in the conflict to defeat these terror
organizations. The IMA has renounced terrorism and may even be willing to fight
against these organizations (Beaumont, 2013).
5.2.3 Ansar Al-Din (AAD).
As of mid-February, Ansar Al-Din has continued to hold fast to its extreme
Islamist ideology. As a result, more moderate members of the organization broke off
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from the group to form the IMA. This demonstrates Ansar Al-Din’s power and prestige
with the population of Northern Mali has suffered as the AFISMA forces took control of
the populated areas. AAD is still closely aligned with AQIM and MUJAO. The strong
Tuareg ties between AAD, IMA and MNLA result in this study classifying these
relationships as positive. AAD has negative ties to the French, ECOWAS, FPR and Malian
government. The AAD relationship with the Arab militias is not known and is therefore
classified as null.
5.2.4 Mali Government Forces.
The Malian government forces are still very weak and vulnerable. While some
Malian forces are assisting the French in the North, on 8 February in the capital, Malian
troops were fighting each other. The old presidential guard, still loyal to the overthrown
president, was attacked by the unelected interim government forces (Harding, 2013a).
In a time where their country is being assisted by foreign forces, the Malian army is
unable to put aside their differences to participate fully in the fighting against the
enemy. This infighting and complications between Malian army units demonstrates the
difficulties of classifying relationships as a whole. While the infighting suggests the
potential for future difficulties, this study assumes the Malian army is loyal to the
interim government and supporting the AFISMA forces in deposing the Islamic
extremists from control of Northern Mali. Mali forces have positive relations with the
French forces, ECOWAS forces and the FPR. Due to ethnic and historical reasons, the
Malian army has negative relations with MNLA and IMA. It has negative relations with
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AQIM, MUJAO and AAD as evidenced by the fighting taking place to remove the
extremists from the country. It is unknown how the Malian forces interact with the
Arab militias, therefore that relationship is classified as null.
5.2.5 African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).
The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) is the combined
international forces operating in Mali. This mission was authorized by the United
Nations in December 2012 and initiated in January when the French intervened in
Northern Mali (February 2013 UN Monthly Forecast - Mali). The French have repeatedly
stated they want to turn the entire operation over to African forces to oversee a
peacekeeping operation. A United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping mission could
additionally be authorized to further support the international effort in Mali. The
AFISMA forces have favorable relations with the Malian government forces, the FPR, the
MNLA and the IMA. The MNLA and presumably the IMA have been supporting the
international forces in Kidal and other strongholds against extremist forces. AFISMA has
negative relations with AAD, AQIM, and MUJAO. Their relation with the Arab militias is
unknown at this time and is therefore classified as null.
5.2.6 Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA).
The Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) is a splinter organization from Ansar AlDin. Led by an important Tuareg tribal leader, Algabass Ag Intallah, they have
renounced terrorism and extremism in favor of a negotiated peace to the Mali conflict
(Beaumont, 2013). The stated goal of the IMA is to set up an autonomous region in
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Northern Mali with a moderate Islamic government. Many of the Tuareg who
participated with Ansar Al-Din were not known to be overly religious prior to joining the
organization. These moderates were willing to support Ansar Al-Din while AAD had
increased power and influence throughout the later part of 2012. Once the French
forces began defeating the Islamic extremists, the moderates of AAD saw a way out of
the extremist organization that AAD had become, leading to the creation of IMA. The
IMA have the same relations as the MNLA. They like AAD, the French, and the ECOWAS
forces and dislike all other actors.

5.3 Assessing Relationships between Actors
The previously identified groups and their relationships provide the basis for the
analysis in the next two sections. The relations between these groups are shown in the
matrix in Table 11 and the network graph in Figure 23 are based on the observations
presented in sections 4.3 and 5.2. It should be noted that the relationships in this
illustrative example are the assessment of the author, based on open source literature.
Actual relationship values should be reviewed and updated by regional, cultural and
subject matter experts.
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MNLA
AQIM
AAD
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt Forces
FPR
IMA
French Forces
ECOWAS Forces

Table 11: Mali Actor’s Relationship Matrix (Post-French Intervention)

MNLA
AQIM
AAD
MUJAO
Arab Militias
Malian Govt Forces
FPR
IMA
French Forces
ECOWAS Forces

-1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
-1
1 1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1
1 1
1
-1 -1 1 -1 -1
-1 1 1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1
-1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1
1 -1 1 1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
-1 1 1
1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
1
1 -1 -1 -1
1 1 1
1
1 -1 -1 -1
1 1 1 1
Negative Relation
Negative
Positive Relation
Positive

Figure 23: Network Graph of 10 Actor Network (Post-French Intervention)
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
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5.4 Partitioning Actors into Subsets
5.4.1 Generalized Blockmodeling
As the number of actors in a network increases, the network graph can begin to
appear cluttered and illegible, clouding the ability of an analyst to make any conclusions.
It is precisely this problem that this thesis is designed to address. With ten actors, there
are 115,929 different partitions possible. Using the relocation method and generalized
blockmodeling, Table 12 identifies the minimum number of inconsistencies and the
number of different subsets with that minimum number of inconsistencies.
Table 12: Minimum Inconsistencies for 10 Actor Model using Relocation Method
# of subsets
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function)
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
22 6 6 6 7 9 10 13 15 16
1 1 4 3 3 10 2 10 16 1

In this network, the minimum number of inconsistencies in a partition is six.
There are six inconsistencies when the network is partitioned into two, three and four
partitions. When partitioned into two, there is one way to partition the network to get
six inconsistencies. There are four ways to partition into three subsets and three ways
to partition into four subsets to get six inconsistencies. Therefore there are eight
partitions identified that have the minimum number of inconsistencies. These eight
partitions should be evaluated in closer detail to determine which of them best
represent the real world situation. In each of these eight situations there are six
relations that do not support social balance theory. See Figure 24 for the network
graphs of the eight different partitions identified.
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Negative Relation
Positive Relation

Figure 24: The graphs for the eight different partitions with six inconsistencies for the
ten actor network. Graph A is partitioned into two subsets. Graphs B, C, D, and E are
partitioned into three subsets. Graphs F, G, and H are partitioned into four subsets.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
The number of times a relationship over all the partitions in Figure 24 is
computed. The relationships that are identified as inconsistent the most often are the
ones that are responsible for the tension in the network as it is currently defined. As
shown in Table 13, the MNLA/AAD and IMA/AAD relations are inconsistent in six out of
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the eight blockmodels. These relations should be reanalyzed to determine if they are
correctly observed or if there is unusually high tension for them to change. These
relations are under stress, but the MNLA and the IMA have clearly stated their
disapproval of the terror and extremism that AAD endorses. However, these groups are
all Tuareg and it is difficult to consider their relations negative despite the current
tension and opposing alliances. These relationships identify AAD as the link between
Tuareg organizations and the Islamic extremists.
The next relationships that appear often are the MNLA and IMA’s relations with
the French and ECOWAS forces. These relations are identified as inconsistent half of the
time. When considered with the previous inconsistencies of the MNLA and IMA’s
relations with AAD, it is obvious that the MNLA and IMA are being pulled in two
different directions. Either they align with the international forces or they align with
AAD. The MNLA and IMA appear to have the option to be the mediator between the
two groups or join one of them and oppose the other. As conditions exist in midFebruary, the MNLA and IMA appear to be taking the mediator approach. They want to
be included by the international forces in any agreement and shaping of the future of
Northern Mali. Since an outright alliance with AAD at this time means being allied with
AQIM and MUJAO, the MNLA and IMA are unlikely to increase ties to AAD at this time.
However, the existing cultural ties between the Tuareg in MNLA, IMA, and AAD will not
disappear and need to be monitored as the situation changes. It is likely that
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individuals, both leaders and fighters, will flow between the organizations as one or
another organization gains power and influence.
Table 13: Number of inconsistencies by relationship occurring in the eight identified
minimum inconsistency blockmodels from the 10 actor network.
# of times
relationship was an
inconsistency out of 8
blockmodels

Relationship

MNLA/AAD
IMA/AAD

6
6

MNLA/ECOWAS
IMA/ECOWAS

4
4

MNLA/French

4

IMA/French
MNLA/Mali Govt
IMA/Mali Govt
MNLA/FPR
IMA/FPR
FPR/French
FPR/ECOWAS
Mali Govt/ French
Mali Govt/ ECOWAS
AQIM/AAD
MUJAO/AAD

4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

5.4.2 Relaxed Blockmodeling
Since there are such a high number of minimum inconsistencies, relaxed
blockmodeling should be conducted to investigate if a better partitioning can be found
when constraints are relaxed. When Relaxed Blockmodeling is conducted on the ten
actor network, the network can be partitioned into five groups with no inconsistencies.
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Table 14 provides the minimum inconsistencies for the 10 actor network using Relaxed
Blockmodeling.
Table 14: Minimum Inconsistencies for 10 Actor Model using relaxed blockmodeling
# of subsets
Min # of Inconsistencies via Relaxed Generalized Blockmodeling
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
16 6 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 2 1 1 8 19 19 9 10

This method identifies zero inconsistencies when the network is partitioned into
five subsets. See Figure 25 for the relaxed blockmodel and Figure 26 for the network
graph of the ten actor network with five subsets.

Figure 25: Relaxed Generalized Blockmodel for the ten actor network partitioned into
five subsets with zero inconsistencies.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
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Negative Relation
Positive Relation

Figure 26: Network graph of ten actor network partitioned based on the Relaxed
Blockmodeling method.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
Since there are no negative blocks on the diagonal and zero inconsistencies, the
network can be reduced without losing any information. By partitioning into the five
subsets identified by relaxed blockmodeling, the graph is reduced from 10 nodes to five
nodes, resulting in a simplified network. This smaller network allows for quicker
calculations and easier to understand observations. The reduced network is shown in
Figure 27.
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Negative Relation
Positive Relation

Figure 27: Reduced Network graph from ten nodes to five nodes.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)

The reduced network allows for some simple observations to be made. First, it
shows AQIM/MUJAO and Mali Government/FPR each have one positive relationship.
Additionally, it shows the other three subsets each have two positive relationships. Any
of the actors that have two positive connections could be considered mediators
between the subsets they connect. For example, if the French wanted to negotiate or
pass a message to the Ansar Al-Din group, it is likely they could do this through MNLA or
IMA and vice versa.
If the reduced network identified by Relaxed Blockmodeling is analyzed for
structural balance, five different partitions can be identified with the minimum number
of inconsistencies of two, see Table 15.
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Table 15: Minimum Inconsistencies Identified by the Reduced Network
# of subsets
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function)
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies

1 2 3 4 5
6 2 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1

Negative Relation
Positive Relation

Figure 28: Five different partitions of the reduced network, each having two
inconsistencies. Graphs A and B are partitioned into two subsets, Graphs C, D, and E
are partitioned into three subsets.
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)
The five different partitions of the reduced network are simplifications of the eight
different partitions identified in the full network. There are five partitions instead of
eight because the Arab Militant groups have been combined with AQIM and MUJAO and
cannot be partitioned into their own subset after being combined. In looking at the five
different subsets, A and E seem to be the best partitions based on what is happening in
Mali. Partition A may make sense for the initial phases of the foreign intervention. The
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MNLA and IMA have supported the international forces and have even captured high
profile members of MUJAO and AAD (Ramzi, 2013), leading one to believe they should
be in the group with the International and Malian forces. However, partition E may be a
better long-term partition of the reduced network because the MNLA/IMA will work
with international forces, but may not work with Malian forces due to mutual distrust.
The AFISMA forces are in Mali to assist the government, therefore their first loyalty
must be to the government forces, making E a more logical partition.
There are three unbalanced triads in each of the partitions in Figure 28, all have
two positive and one negative relation. AQIM/MUJAO, AAD, and MNLA/IMA are one
triad, AAD, MNLA/IMA, ECOWAS/French is another, and Mali government/FPR,
ECOWAS/French, and MNLA/IMA is the third. These types of unbalanced triads can
become balanced by the negative relation turning positive or one of the positive
relations turning negative. Essentially if any relation in the triad changes, it becomes
balanced. While these triads remain unbalanced there is tension between the three
actors involved. The only actor involved in more than one unbalanced triad is
MNLA/IMA; therefore they are under the most pressure to change their relations.
However, this also puts them in a position to mediate between the two major subsets,
once again making partition E the likely partition for the post-French intervention
network.
Assuming that partition E is the best partition for the real-life situation in Mali
and that no additional key actors will enter the network, there are three options to
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make partition E balanced. The MNLA/IMA is shown as a mediator between the two
larger groups; the Islamic militants on the top part of the graph and the International
forces on the bottom. MNLA/IMA can create a balanced network by making their
relations to both AAD and ECOWAS/French negative (isolating themselves), they can
make their relation negative to ECOWAS/French and positive to AQIM/MUJAO (joining
the Islamic groups), or they could make their relation negative to AAD and positive to
Mali government/FPR (joining the International forces). Contrary to social balance, the
author does not foresee any of these changes taking place. Instead, the MNLA/IMA is
likely to try to enhance its role as mediator between the groups and strengthen its
position as an intermediary. Acting in this role provides the MNLA/IMA with influence
and control over negotiations and governance. Therefore tension within the network is
likely to continue.

5.5 Additional Social Network Analysis
Just as was done in section 4.6, the popularity measures likes minus dislikes, a
ratio of likes over total relations, and eigenvector centrality are used to evaluate the ten
actor signed network. Recall that these are different popularity measures. Likes minus
dislikes counts the number of positive and negative relations each actor has and
subtracts them. The ratio measure divides the positive relations by the total relations to
provide a percentage of friends for each actor. The actors with higher, more positive
values are more popular. The values are listed in Table 16. Although these measures do
not take into account the strength of the actors, it does provide an indication of the
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popularity of the actors based on the actors included in the model. The larger a
network is, the less susceptible the likes minus dislikes and ratio of likes measurements
are to actors omitted from the model. If the assumption is valid that the more popular
an actor is, the more influence they have on the network, then the actors that score
higher on pure popularity measures (likes minus dislikes and ratio of likes) are the most
influential within a network. Since these two measures do not take into account who
the relationship is with, as eigenvector centrality does, the actors that score high on
these measurements can influence the most actors. Alternatively, eigenvector
centrality identifies the actors that influence the most popular actors.

Table 16: Popularity measures of actors (Post-French Intervention): Likes minus
Dislikes and Ratio of Likes/Total relations (sorted from highest to lowest)

Militant Group

French Forces
ECOWAS Forces
AAD
IMA
MNLA
Malian Govt Forces
Arab Militias
FPR
AQIM
MUJAO

Ratio: #
Likes
Likes over
minus Total
Dislikes Relations
2
0.63
2
0.63
0
0.50
0
0.50
-1
0.44
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-2

0.38

-2
-3
-4
-4

0.00
0.33
0.25
0.25

When comparing the popularity of individual actors in Table 16 to the same actors
in Table 8, the Pre-French intervention network, the results seem to be reversed.
Instead of the Islamic groups being the most popular, they have become the least
popular. This makes sense since all three of the new actors added to the model are
anti-Islamic extremists. The exception to this is AAD. AAD is surprisingly still popular
according to these measures even though they are most associated with the two least
popular groups.
Eigenvector centrality calculates an increase in popularity of an actor if they have
a positive relation to a popular actor or a negative relation to an unpopular actor and a
decrease if they have a negative relation to a popular actor or a positive relation to an
unpopular actor. Eigenvector centrality of the ten actor network is shown in Table 17.
Table 17: Eigenvector Centrality of actors (Post-French Intervention)

Militant Group

French Forces
ECOWAS Forces
FPR
Malian Govt Forces
MNLA
IMA
Arab Militias
AAD
AQIM
MUJAO
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Eigenvector
Centrality
0.398
0.398
0.339
0.328
0.129
0.118
-0.076
-0.28
-0.398
-0.398

The order of Table 17 is similar to Table 16 except AAD and FPR have flip-flopped
positions. This is because FPR is positively connected to the most popular actors and
negatively connected to the most unpopular actors while AAD is positively connected to
the most unpopular actors and negatively connected to the most popular actors. The
eigenvector centrality rankings, when grouped, provide the same partition as identified
via the partition we identified in Figure 28E. At least according to these two illustrative
examples, the eigenvector centrality measure provides not only a popularity measure
but also a potential partitioning of the actors. More analysis should be conducted to
determine if this is the case in other types of examples. The approach outlined here,
however, does suggest an area to focus future research efforts.

5.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusions
Taking the influential militant actors in Northern Mali from 11 January to 11
February 2013 as an example; this chapter analyzes the positive and negative relations
and makes some observations about the subsets and mediators within the network.
Additionally, specific relations are identified as causing tension to the network based on
social balance theory. Generalized blockmodeling found eight out of 115,929 possible
partitions that minimized the inconsistencies in the network according to social balance
theory. Relaxed Blockmodeling was then used to reduce the network from ten actors to
five. These five actors were blockmodeled a second time finding five partitions that
minimized the inconsistencies. These five partitions were analyzed to determine the
most likely partition to fit the example. It was determined that there are likely two main
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subsets, the Islamic extremists and the International forces. Additionally, the
MNLA/IMA were found to be the probable mediators between the two subsets.
Popularity measures were calculated to identify influential actors within the network.
These measures found the popular actors from Chapter Four (the Islamic extremists)
were not popular in this network and the unpopular actors became much more popular
due to the inclusion of the additional actors.
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6 Findings and Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the overall contributions of the research methodology
to the operational and academic communities, reiterates the results of the research
from Chapters Four and Five, and presents recommendations for future research.

6.2 Contributions of the Research
This research provides a methodology to analyze signed networks based on
social balance theory. It identifies a way to partition a signed network to identify likely
subsets within the network. Unique actors and relationships are pinpointed based on
inconsistencies or imbalances within the network. Inconsistent relationships are more
likely to change than other relationships because there is increased tension between the
actors involved. Identifying this tension provides analysts with insight into the
complexities of the network and potential relationships in which to influence. These
relationships can be targeted to stabilize or destabilize a network.
The model can be used by analysts to analyze an array of different real world
situations. For example, if data is available on like/dislike tribal relations in a region of
interest, this model could aid in identifying the sources of tension within that area of
operations as well as the popularity of the actors, identification of allied groups, and the
actors that can mediate between those groups. Another possible application is the
militia groups currently operating in Libya. Since only some are friendly to the
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government and all have varying feelings toward each other, these relationships could
be modeled to gain additional insights into the web of relationships. A third application
is the complex relations of the different opposition groups operating within Syria. These
groups are disjoint and have competing goals and ideologies, making the network
difficult to dissect without this methodology.
Another interesting application would be to assess the relations between the
international forces assisting in Mali. All of the different countries providing troops may
have conflicting relations between each other and the local population. Positive and
negative relations need to be considered in any type of international humanitarian or
support mission. In whatever application, increased knowledge about how these groups
relate to each other can provide important information to aid U.S. decision making
within a region of interest.

6.3 Results of the Research
The two illustrative examples provided in this research assess the conflict in Mali
from January 2012 to 11 January 2013 (Pre-French Intervention, Chapter Four) and from
11 January 2013 to 11 February 2013 (Post-French Intervention, Chapter Five). The first
example identified the relationship between Ansar Al-Din and the MNLA as being under
particularly high tension to change. After the French intervened, the Ansar Al-Din group
split in two; one group stayed with the Islamic extremist subgroup and the other group
(IMA) became allied more closely with the MNLA. This split was likely due to the tension
identified by employing the methodology on the Chapter Four model. In the post-
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French Intervention example of Chapter Five, two main subsets were identified; the
Islamic militants and the International forces. The MNLA/IMA is a third subset and
determined to be the mediator between the two main subsets. It is likely the Malian
government will be reliant on the International forces and the MNLA/IMA to help them
fight the Islamic militants for the foreseeable future. This provides the MNLA/IMA the
ability to leverage this role to achieve more autonomy for the Tuareg in Northern Mali.

6.4 Recommendations for Future Research
This research offers a starting point for the modeling and analysis of signed social
networks with military applications. There are many plausible areas to expand this
methodology with future research.
While this methodology advances analysis by evaluating signed network data, it
would be useful to assess the strength of the tie in addition to the sign. Instead of just
having -1, 0, and 1 as tie strength, it would provide much more insight if the strength of
tie could be any continuous number from -1 to 1, where the extremes are strong
relations and zero is no relation. Having continuous numbers would essentially weight
the tie putting more confidence and importance on relations that are known to be
stronger. While the examples used in this research did not take into account directional
relations, the methodology does support the ability to analyze directional ties.
Assessing signed dark networks is possible using this methodology as well.
However, relations between certain actors within dark networks are often times
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unknown. If a partial signed dark network is known, unknown relations could be
propagated using techniques similar to Guha et. al. (2004). In this manner potential
relations could be hypothesized to populate the unknown parts of the network. As
relations are revealed, the network can be updated for better results. If results do not
match what is predicted by the network, sources of tension, mediating parties, and
alliances could be identified through inconsistencies in the network.
This methodology identified specific relations and actors that were unique to the
network in order to decrease conflict within the network. In other words it attempted
to identify ways to make the network more stable. However, this methodology could be
altered to identify ties that are vulnerable in order to make a network less stable. Less
stable enemy networks can slow down the enemy’s ability to act.

6.5 Conclusions
The United States military is often called to operate in unknown places
throughout the world. Each place has its own unique set of actors and web of relations
between those actors. This research provides a methodology for assessing complicated
relationships in a setting where conflict is evident by assessing the positive and negative
relations between key actors. Groups of actors, mediators and relations vulnerable to
change can be identified to provide insight into complex networks. It provides another
tool in the analyst’s repertoire to assist in identifying key relations and suggesting
potential causes of action.
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